A Far Eastern Munich: appeasement by omission. by Carns, Neil S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1970-03















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a Master of Public Administration degree -













I FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITY 1
II MARCO POLO TO GENEVA:
THE DEMISE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 22
III QUARANTINE TO BRUSSELS:
HOPE AND DISILLUSIONMENT 55
IV CONCLUSIONS 86
V CHRONOLOGY 92




"...Effects in war seldom proceed from one simple cause, but
from several joint causes, and that therefore it is not enough
in a candid and impartial spirit to trace back the series of
events to its beginning, but is then still necessary to assign
to each of the contributing causes its due weight. This leads,
therefore to a closer investigation of their nature, and thus






The influence of history on foreign policy decisions is recognizable and
demonstrable. The extent of this influence is described elusively at best.
Often, the interpretation given to historical fact is more significant than
the fact itself. To the degree that an historical concept is part of the
decision-making process, the resultant events will become dependent upon past
history. Thus decisions of causation are able to evoke trends of action or
behavioral patterns that can become self-perpetuating or, in a less positive
sense, at least reinforcing. On the other hand, if decisions are made inten-
tionally to avert what is predicted to be an analogous situation, the repeat-
ability or cyclic theory of history is broken. It is the success of this
latter case which is the most difficult to substantiate: there is no
convenient means of recording non-events.
Historical analogy can be a useful tool in the decision-making process
if used with circumspection. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a noted historian,
has described the role of history in international polity:
History, in short, does not furnish the statesman with a
detailed scenario of particular relationships or policies.
Too often it equips his decisions with good rather than real
reasons, holding out a mirror in which he fatuously sees his
own face.... This is not an argument against the knowledge
of history: it is an argument against the superficial knowl-
edge of history. The only antidote to a shallow knowledge
of history is a deeper knowledge, the knowledge which pro-
duces not dogmatic certitude but diagnostic skill, not
clairvoyance but insight.
A classic example of the effect of a superficial knowledge of history is
the "unconditional surrender" policy sponsored during World War II by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Schlesinger indicated that this policy was
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Bitter Heritage : Vietnam and American
Democracy
,
1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 95-6.

2derived in part from an erroneous recollection of American history.
Roosevelt believed that General Grant had called for an "unconditional sur-
render" at Appomattox and then had responded to the surrender with acts of
generosity to the defeated foe. This was the spirit that Roosevelt wanted to
prevail at the end of the war. The facts, however, show that Grant talked of
"unconditional surrender" at Fort Donelson and Vicksburg, not at Appomattox.
Thus what implied magnanimity to Roosevelt, had a totally different connota-
tion for most people.
The value of probing into historical decisions and policy developments
is not necessarily related as much to the scorecard tabulations of wins
versus losses in the national interest as it is to elucidating the evolution
of processes. Extending this theme, it can be shown that the intent of
individual decisions for national security may by the process of evolution




Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt and His Detractors," Harper's
Magazine, Vol. CC, No. 1201 (June 1950), 65.

IFOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITY
History has influenced the meaning of appeasement. Events subsequent to
the Munich Crisis of 1938 have left the stigma of failure on the foreign
policies of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Appeasement, for
many people who have lived or studied the events of World War II, conjures
vivid memories of Mr. Chamberlain's arrival at the Heston Aerodrome when he
waved an Anglo-German Declaration and boasted that "peace in our time" had
u A 1been secured.
The pacificatory approach to foreign affairs was not initially formulated
by Mr. Chamberlain. Its origins can be traced at least to 1933 when Sir John
3
Simon was Britain's Foreign Secretary. The policy was continued in one form
or another by succeeding Foreign Secretaries and by Prime Ministers until the
outbreak of hostilities over the settlement of the "Polish Question" in 1939.
Anthony Eden stated that he had "...occasionally used the word 'appeasement'
in a speech or minute for the Foreign Office in the sense of the first meaning
given in the Oxford English Dictionary
,
'to bring to peace, settle, (strife,
etc.)'. It was not until some years later, when the results of the foreign
For a brief coverage, including documentation and historical analysis,
of the Munich Crisis of 1938 see Peace or Appeasement : Hitler , Chamberlain ,
and the Munich Crisis edited by Francis L. Lowenheim (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1965).
2
For the text of the Anglo-German Declaration see the London Times
,
October 1, 1938, 14, or Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London:
H.M. Stationery Office, 1946-1961), Third Series, II, No. 1228 Appendix.
To place the event in context see the enthusiastic reception given to
Chamberlain upon his return from Munich as reported in the London Times , Octo-
ber 1, 1938, 7 and 12.
Typical expressions of gratitude are also given in Sir Keith Feiling,
Neville Chamberlain (London: MacMillan, 1947), 378-82.
3An interesting and provocative account of the source of appeasement
policies in the 1930's is given in A.L. Rowse, Appeasement : A Study in Polit-
ical Decline, 1933-1939 (New York: Norton, 1961).

policy pursued by Mr. Chamberlain became apparent, that the word was more
strongly associated with the last meaning given in the dictionary, ! to pacify,
by satisfying demands'."
Perhaps it is well to digress momentarily to consider the role of words,
themselves, in international polity. Traditional instruments available to
decision-makers in their pursuit of national objectives include alternatives
such as diplomacy, sanctions, and, unfortunately, war. However in a world
where traditional values become increasingly less sacrosanct and where the
open manifestation of power more often than not is a political liability, an
effective tool has been fashioned which, for want of a better term, can be
labelled "semantics." The usefulness of "semantics" is demonstrable readily
in such instances where "wars" become "police actions" and "blockades"
become "quarantines." Whereas these terms relate to objective, legalistic
interpretations, a word such as appeasement has become, post Munich, so sub-
jective in nature that, when politically oriented, it elicits an emotional
response. Both the objective and the subjective use of semantics can be
important political instruments if they are utilized circumspectly.
The topic of Semantic Politics is quite interesting; however, since it
is incidental to the main theme of this study, an awareness of its potenti-
alities is presently sufficient.
Appeasement, as used herein, will ascribe to the latter definition in the
Oxford English Dictionary : "to pacify, by satisfying demands." Two problems
should be recognized with the use of an emotion-laden word like appeasement to
describe a political theory. At one extreme lies the danger that the term can
be overworked (as evidenced by prolific use in civil rights, civil disturb-
4
Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators : the Memoirs of Anthony Eden , Earl
of Avon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 363.

ances, and labor-management controversies) to the extent that it becomes
bathetic. On the other hand, William Henry Chamberlin points out that if it
is not recognized for what it is, political and moral concessions may be
yielded "under such respectable verbal camouflage as 'flexibility,' 'realism, 1
and 'making necessary adjustments'."
Few historians will argue that Munich was not the pinnacle of appeasement,
but many will contest the base upon which the "pinnacle" rests. The Treaty of
Versailles, the League of Nations, reparations, isolation, disarmament, rearm-
ament, the Mukden Incident and Far East Crisis, the remilitarization of the
Rhineland, the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict, the Spanish Civil War, the Sino-
Japanese Undeclared War, and the annexation of Austria are all undoubtedly
part of the base. Although the British invented the foreign policy label of
"Appeasement" and have been held accountable for the Munich settlement, they
cannot be criticized as being the only proponents of actions intended to
pacify the totalitarian powers prior to World War II.
The agreement attained at Munich in 1938 was a commitment to peace in
Europe. The price was Czechoslovakian integrity. Appeasement at Munich was
manifest. Acts of omission by other nations, while not as obvious as the
Munich arrangement, had resulted in policies that also deserve the label
applied to Mr. Chamberlain's efforts.
Diplomatic historians, political scientists, statesmen, diplomats, and
other representatives from almost every imaginable discipline have devoted
much time and effort in attempting to determine the causes of World War II.
Investigative emphasis has been predominantly directed toward European events.
This preoccupation is a natural phenomenon growing out of strong historical
William Henry Chamberlin, Appeasement : Road To War (New York: Rolton
House, 1962), 22-3.

ties of philosophy and culture. However, many events in the Far East have
not been given sufficient attention by those who have tried to analyze the
gradual collapse of the world peace machinery that was established in vain
after the First World War.
The Nine Power Conference of Brussels in 1937 culminates a period of
diplomatic failure which has been largely ignored by historians. Treating
the Brussels Conference as an isolated event makes it relatively easy either
to censure or to praise the conduct of the involved nations. The intention is
not to judge the participants and their policies out of context or with the
help of hindsight but rather to analyze the events objectively in order to
gain an understanding of what happened, where diplomacy failed, and what were
the probable effects.
The cardinal moment in a political analysis of the Brussels Conference is
not yet apparent—even though more than thirty intervenient years have provid-
ed the analyst with ample information and a position of objectivity for a
dispassionate critique. Assuming that the interrelationships of nation-states
are not discrete events but more precisely a sequence of connected exchanges,
some background chronology is essential for analytical perspective.
The decade of the 1930' s can fairly be said to have been a significant
transitional and educational period in the maturation of American international
political thought. A literal description of this era does not indicate so much
the evolution of a political philosophy, but rather a groping among theories.
Theories were abundant and, regardless of their premises, they all had as their
main objective the maintenance of world peace, particularly with regard to any
involvement of the United States. Although some of the theories were even-
For a discussion on recent thinking about Far East research see Histor-
ians and American Far Eastern Policy compiled by Dorothy Borg (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1966).

tually incorporated into statutes, the active conduct of American Foreign
Policy continued to rely on pragmatism. Broadly speaking, two-thirds of the
decade was devoted to the establishment of legislative statutes to avoid war
in the abstract. The remaining one-third was spent in attempts to circumvent
the legislation to deal with war in reality.
The New Deal, ushered in with the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt
as President of the United States on March 4, 1933, promised at least a pos-
sibility of a more active role for the United States in world affairs. To be
sure, the country at large expected, and was not deceived, that domestic re-
forms would take priority over international problems. But, after all, the
new President had been schooled in Wilsonian, cooperative internationalism.
Service as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administration and
Vice-Presidential candidacy in the 1920 elections, when internationalism was a
prime issue, seemed to portend a more participatory United States.
Francis Perkins, who was the Secretary of Labor throughout all of
Roosevelt's Administrations, has provided some insight to the President's
thoughts about the correct way to approach foreign affairs. In the early
months of the first Administration, Perkins discussed plans with Roosevelt for
the United States to join the International Labor Organization. Responding
favorably, the President, however, cautioned: "Don't try to do this without
the full assent and understanding of the members of Congress responsible for
foreign policy. Remember how Wilson lost the League of Nations," he continued,
"lost the opportunity for the United States to take part in the most important
international undertaking ever conceived. He [Wilson] lost it by not getting
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Norman H. Davis are evaluated
in a lengthy article as being an exceptionally well-qualified and well-
balanced trio to conduct the international affairs of the United States. New
York Times [hereafter cited as NYT], May 28, 1933, VI, 15.

Congress to participate." Later, Roosevelt amplified his thoughts on the
congressional role by saying it "is a lesson in patience. You have to give
men an opportunity to understand for themselves in their own way. You can't
9
rush them. Not in a democracy."
An auspicious and dramatic indication of a shift in foreign policies was
announced to the world by Ambassador-At-Large Norman H. Davis, who was at that
time the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the long and futile
Geneva General Disarmament Conference. On May 23, 1933, Mr. Davis stated, in
part, that "in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a
state has been guilty of a breech of the peace in violation of its interna-
tional obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur
in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will re-
frain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these
states may thus make to restore peace." Davis, however, did preface his
remarks by saying that the American commitment was contingent upon some form
of international agreement towards general c-isarmament . This step toward
collective security, however guarded by technicalities, did demonstrate that
the United States was willing to admit some degree of responsibility for world
peace.
Concurrent with the Geneva Pledge, the Administration was backing a pro-
posal, initiated during President Herbert Hoover's tenure, to provide legisla-
tion that would allow the President to embargo arms shipments to aggressor
340.
o
Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946),
9
Ibid. , 343.
U.S. Dept. of State, Peace and War : United States Foreign Policy , 1931-
1941 [hereafter cited as Peace and War ] (Washington: U.S. Govt. P. 0., 1943),
188-189.

nations. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the leader-
ship of Senator Key Pittman, obstinately held out for an embargo impartially
applied to both parties in any conflict. Not willing to risk much political
capital on this issue, the Administration ceased to back the plan and allowed
it to die in limbo. The ultimate futility of the Disarmament Conference made
it an academic question as to how the United States would substantively dis-
charge the Geneva pledge in view of the Senate defeat. This isolationist
triumph over Roosevelt's initial steps in the direction of foreign policy was
12
a portent of future, even more drastic, collective security inhibitions.
The term "isolation" (in various forms) is used repeatedly throughout
this paper. It usually connotes a political philosophy or doctrinaire guide
for the conduct of foreign affairs. However, it is quite misleading to repre-
sent United States participation in world events by a single policy label of
"isolationism." Senator William E. Borah succinctly illustrated this problem
when he spoke before the Council of Foreign Relations on January 8, 1934:
In matters of trade and commerce we have never been isola-
tionist and never will be. In matters of finance, unfortunately,
we have not been isolationist and never will be. When earth-
quake and famine, or whatever brings human suffering, visit any
part of the human race, we have not been isolationists, and
never will be.... But in all matters political, in all commit-
ments of any nature or kind, which encroach in the slightest
upon the free and unembarrassed action of our people, or which
circumscribe their discretion and judgment, we have been free,
we have been independent, we have been isolationist. 13
It was indeed unfortunate that the leadership of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in such an eventful era passed to Pittman, whose own
horizons were generally limited to Nevada, silver, and drinking.
For a critical appraisal of Pittman's life in the Senate see Fred L.
Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1963).
12
Ironically, Roosevelt approved the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
desire for an impartial embargo: Hull later persuaded the President to drop
the entire legislation. Evidence presented in Robert A. Divine, The Illusion
of Neutrality (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1962), 54.
13Quoted in Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America , 1935-1941 (Ithaca:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1966), 5.

A long period of physical remoteness from Europe and Asia allowed the
development of a tradition of independence for the United States in interna-
tional relations. Twentieth-century technology, aided immensely by World War
I, removed the fact of a geographically isolated nation but not the desire to
retain the traditional freedom for unilateral action in foreign affairs. The
United States emerged from World War I as a de facto world power regardless of
many public and private sentiments for a return to the apparent international
simplicity of the nineteenth century.
Tacit recognition of an increasing interdependency in the community of
nations gradually relegated the concept of isolation from its application to
a wide variety of international activities (economics, law, health, politics,
14
etc.) to an almost exclusive association with American political behavior.
The political interpretation, which had evolved by the early 1930' s, can be
briefly described as being an advocation of unencumbered, unilateral action
by the United States in matters pertaining to national security. This defini-
tion was flexible enough to attract supporters with political philosophies
which incorporated varying degrees of nationalism, pacifism, and stoicism.
The experiences gained from international cooperation during the First
World War and the subsequent abortive attempts to find a just and enduring
basis for world peace led to a belief by the isolationists of the 1930's tnat
14
The argument can be made that all international activity is a function
of polity, but the distinction is presently not necessary.
There is no intention to imply that international cooperation in "non-
political" affairs was always forthcoming. The failure of the World Economic
Conference in July 1933 was attributed to Roosevelt's message which essentially
refused any cooperation in tying the U.S. dollar to foreign currencies in a
plan designed to create international monetary stability. Likewise, an at-
tempt to join the World Court, which had appeared politically feasible in the
spring of 1935, was defeated in the Senate with the aid of a phenomenal amount
of last minute public protests.

foreign entanglements and war were synonamous terms. Thus whatever unity
existed among the isolationists was based, as Professor Manfred Jonas has
written, on a "faith in unilateralism and fear of war."
With a growing domestic sentiment for aloofness from foreign embroilments
and the Senate rejection in the spring of 1933 of legislation to provide for
an impartial arms embargo, the Administration was in the precarious position
of having to forego any new attempt for cooperation in international politics,
especially with the European centered League of Nations. Many diverse organ-
izations (ranging from "peace-at-any-price" societies to reknown legal forums
to veterans' associations) were quite prepared to seize the initiative and
press for a strict neutrality policy designed to insulate the United States
from war. Although these groups started with many different premises, they,
almost unanimously, arrived at the same conclusion that the evils of war could
be prevented by appropriate legislation.
For any who doubt the power of an articulate minority to influence public
opinion and force congressional action, the years 1934-1937 provide an abun-
dance of case studies.
One of the most successful lobbyists in Washington, Dorothy Detzer, was
instrumental in instigating a congressional investigation of the munitions
industry. Nearly two years of intense and skillful lobbying by Miss Detzer
For more complete and detailed coverage of "isolationism" see: Selig
Adler, The Isolationist Impulse : Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York:
Abelard-Schuman, 1957); Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism :
Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy (Indiana-
polis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1962); and Manfred Jonas, Isolationism In
America
,
1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966).
Jonas, 23.




resulted in the introduction of the "investigation" resolution to the Senate
1 8
on February 8, 1934.
Public clamor for an investigation was aroused by publicity to the effect
that munitions and banking interests had to a great extent formed a quasi
19international conspiracy which was largely responsible for World War I.
Bowing to popular demands, the Senate created a special committee to
20investigate the munitions industry. Senator Gerald P. Nye, an arch isola-
tionist from North Dakota, was selected, with apparently too little fore-
21
thought, to head the committee. Political wisdom dictated an Administration
endorsement of the committee's mandate. However, when Senator Nye strayed
from the industrial context of the inquiry and began to question the political
integrity of American involvement in the War, the Administration began to have
second thoughts.
Nye's investigation consumed the better part of two of the critical mid-
thirties' years. There were public hearings and private hearings, but always
1 8
For a personal account of a career dedicated to pacifism see Dorothy
Detzer, Appointment on the Hill (New York: Holt, 1948).
Not all of Miss Detzer 's logic is as sagacious as her brief statement
describing the evolution of war: "War does not spring into life like a bur-
glar into a window. It grows step by evil step—through stupid and short-
sighted policies, or through deliberate acts of injustice, or even just the
good old sins of omission ." (Underlining is mine.) Ibid . , 67-8.
19
The works most generally cited as having a catalytic effect on public
opinion are: Helmuth C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death
(New York, 1934); Gilbert Seldes, Iron , Blood , and Profits : An Exposure of
the World-Wide Munitions Racket (New York, 1934); and "Arms and Men," Fortune
,
IX (March, 1934), 52-7 and 113-26.
20
The Senate approved the resolution for the investigation without a
single dissenting vote on April 12, 1934.
21
A tactical blunder was made when Vice-President John Nance Garner and
Senator Pittman deviated from the normal Senate custom and allowed the
committee to choose its chairman. Although the committee had a majority of
Democrats, they selected extreme isolationist Nye, a Republican Senator.

11
spectacular (if not strictly factual) press releases. The committee's report
was based mainly on the testimonies delivered before it in September, 1934,
and in January and February, 1936. The investigators produced no conclusive
proof of misconduct, but they did have sufficient information to criticize
22
severely many of the business and financial ethics of the industry.
Perhaps the most realistic summary of the committee's work was provided
by Secretary of State Cordell Hull when he wrote in his memoirs:
The Nye Committee aroused an isolationist sentiment that was
to tie the hands of the Administration just at the very time
when our hands should have been free to place the weight of our
influence in the scales where it would count. It tangled our
relations with the very nations whom we should have been morally
supporting. It stirred the resentment of other nations with
whom we had no quarrels. It confused the minds of our own
people as to the real reasons that led us into the First World
War. It showed the prospective aggressors in Europe and Asia
that our public opinion was pulling a cloak over its head and
becoming nationally unconcerned with their designs and that
therefore they could proceed with fuller confidence. 23
On the other hand, Dorothy Detzer's opinion was that "no Senate committee ever
rendered to the American people a more intelligent or important service."
24
She concluded that "it was the nation's loss that it did not comprehend it."
Concurrent with and somewhat related to Nye's crusading exploits was the
struggle for neutrality legislation. There was no lack of theories on the
25
subjects of neutrality and its parent—the avoidance of war. Several schools
22
The results of the Nye committee investigation are contained in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the
Munitions Industry
,
S. Rept. 944, 74th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (7 vols,
Washington: U.S. Govt. P.O., 1935 & 1936).
23Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: Mac-




Two of the more prominent and provocative theories were presented in:
James T. Shotwell, On The Rim Of The Abyss (New York: Macmillan, 1936).
Shotwell pictures the nation-states as being in an abyss of concentric circles.
The inner circles are positions most threatened by the danger of war. Shotwell

12
of thought predominated and included a range of proposals from ostrich-like
isolation (with and without military protection) to traditional "freedom-of-
the-seas" neutrality to active enforcement of peace (either by collective or
, ,. v 26
singular action)
.
Basically the lines drawn in 1933— the Administration favoring a discre-
tionary arms embargo resolution and the Senate remaining adamant for impar-
tiality—held firm in 1934. The Chaco War, which embraced a territorial
dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, provided the impetus for compromise
neutrality legislation on an ad hoc basis. In essence, the President was
authorized to ban the sale of arms to both parties in the conflict if he
determined that such action would promote the restoration of peace.
The search for more permanent legislation added a new dimension in the
spring of 1934 when Charles Warren advocated that a neutral nation desiring to
avoid war would have to exclude both its people and trade from the war
theaters. Warren recognized some of the problems associated with his proposal,
and he cautioned:
The question then arises, however, whether, under such
circumstances, the price of neutrality may not be too high;
and whether neutrality, with such added burdens and conces-
sions or surrender of rights, will not be too disagreeable
a status for this country to assume. And thus the further
question is at once presented: Should not the people of
this country be led to give more serious, intense, and con-
argues that the United States position is on the outer rim, and he tries to
show how to maintain that position.
Charles A. Beard, The Devil Theory of War (New York: Vanguard, 1936).
Beard's theory is that, "War is not the work of a demon. It is our very own
work, for which we prepare, wittingly or not, in ways of peace." He argues
that most people don't recognize that they are preparing for war in the name
of peace.
26
There is an abundance of literature advocating the isolationist and
interventionist schools of thought. "Freedom-of-the-seas" neutralists, how-
ever, were not numerous. Perhaps the most respected publication representing
this school is Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, Neutrality for the
United States (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1940).

13
tinuous consideration to joining with other nations in all
practicable movements to prevent the occurrence of any war
which would involve us in so difficult, so burdensome, and
so disagreeable (even if not impossible) neutrality?^'
Warren was subsequently engaged by the State Department to make a detailed
study of the entire question of neutrality legislation. Warren's report
quickened Presidential interest in the subject. Thus, with some degree of
certainty, legislative action could be projected for the congressional ses-
sions in 1935. Preferring not to have any such legislation, the State Depart-
ment vacillated over various drafts in an attempt to come up with a workable
Administration proposal. Secretary Hull recorded in his memoirs that he "did
not want to see legislation which, by telling the world in advance what we
would not do in case of war, would prevent our exercising our influence to
prevent war; nor legislation which, if war came, would prevent our rendering
the least assistance to the world organization; the League of Nations, in its
90
efforts to bring the war to an end."
The Nye disclosures together with the catalytic effect of the impending
Italo-Ethiopian War galvanized isolationist sentiment and forced congressional
action. The Administration finally agreed to support a bill which would allow
a discretionary arms embargo—a return to the original 1933 position. However,
the chances were slim that a measure would be approved permitting such
Presidential discretion without strong pressure being exerted on the legisla-
tive bodies by the Chief Executive. This, Roosevelt was reluctant to do as it
27.
Charles Warren, "Troubles of a Neutral," Foreign Affairs , Vol. XII,
No. 3 (April, 1934), 394.
It is paradoxical that Charles Warren, an Assistant Attorney General
under President Wilson and an ardent internationalist, became the chief





might have endangered the prospects for passage of several domestic bills
29
which he considered vital.
A compromise solution was finally worked out which gave a sop to the
Administration in the form of a temporary life of six months for the mandatory
arms embargo section of the bill. The first Neutrality Act became law with
the President's signature on August 31, 1935, and this was the moment that
Roosevelt chose to speak out. In a release announcing approval of the legis-
lation, President Roosevelt stated that: "History is filled with unforesee-
able situations that call for some flexibility of action. It is conceivable
that situations may arise in which the wholly inflexible provisions of Section
I of this act [mandatory embargo] might have exactly the opposite effect from
that which was intended. In other words, the inflexible provisions might drag
30
us into war instead of keeping us out."
Neutrality legislation received its baptismal fire with the outbreak of
active hostilities in Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. In this instance the
United States acted with an alacrity that satisfied even the staunchest isola-
tionists.
Prior to departing the Capitol for an extended fishing trip, the Presi-
dent, anticipating the outbreak of open warfare, had signed (September 25) an
undated draft neutrality proclamation. Since no declarations of war had been
made, Roosevelt sent a message to Hull on October 4: "If, when you receive
this, you have any official confirmation of Italian invasion and of battles
and casualties well within the Ethiopian border, it seems to me that this
29
For Hull's objections to the impartial embargo plan and a proposal for
Roosevelt to come out publicly in favor of the Administration's proposed









constitutes war within the intent of the statute and should be proclaimed as
31
such by me." Hull responded affirmatively but added some additional con-
siderations of whether or not a United States proclamation would undermine
collective action by the League of Nations. President Roosevelt decided that
the announcement should be released "immediately in view of the undoubted
32
state of war and without waiting for League action."
But neither the American proclamation of neutrality nor the subsequent
abortive attempt by the League of Nations to impose economic sanctions had any
real success in curbing Mussolini's imperialistic ambitions. However, what
did become apparent was that all trade, especially in strategic materials, not
merely arms and munitions, was of vital importance to a nation's war-making
capability.
Therefore, when Congress convened in January 1936, the prospects for
enlarging the scope of neutrality to include broader trade restrictions were
favorable. Unfortunately, an impasse was soon reached between the isolation-
ists, who favored mandatory restrictions, and those who backed the Administra-
tion's desire for discretionary powers. Time necessitated a solution, and
this was achieved by a compromise which extended the 1935 Act (with three
inconsequential amendments) until May 1, 1937.
Worthy of note is a statement, by Representative Melvin J. Mass of
Minnesota, made during the neutrality debates in Congress. Referring to the
proposed legislation, Mass declared, "This is the most cruel, most un-American
31
Hull, I, 428.
Roosevelt's enthusiasm for declaring neutrality in this instance was
prompted largely by the circumstances: Italy would be hurt relatively more
than Ethiopia by a neutral United States. Roosevelt's eagerness is also in
marked contrast to his later action in the Sino-Japanese Undeclared War.
32




thing I have ever seen or heard in this house." He continued, with an
amazing accuracy (in retrospect), to indict the direction in which he predic-
ted American foreign policy was heading: "While for a time we may escape
involvement in foreign wars, the ultimate outcome will be that a few powerful,
militaristic nations, unchecked by anything, will gradually create a situation
of world-wide conquest, and the time will come when we alone will be left in
the way of their complete world dominance. As surely as we take this attitude
of smug indifference now, we ourselves will then become the object of attack
A . . „34and invasion.
Roosevelt's campaign for reelection did not portend any dramatic changes
for a more active leadership in world events. In fact, public pronouncements
were remarkable for their ambivalence towards foreign affairs—"political
finesse" may be a better term to describe the studied, not too committal
statements.
The 1936 Democratic Party Platform reflected not the suggestions made by
Secretary Hull for executive discretion, but actually endorsed Republican
Senator Nye's isolationist views. In part, the platform stated: "We shall
continue to observe a true neutrality in the disputes of others; to be pre-
pared resolutely to resist aggression against ourselves; to work for peace and
to take the profits out of war; to guard against being drawn by political
commitments, international banking, or private trading, into any war which may
35develop anywhere."
After the seemingly strong stand taken in the Party Platform, political
analysts were given second thoughts by a major campaign address, devoted
33
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entirely to foreign affairs, delivered by the President in Chautauqua, New
York. Roosevelt stated that:
We are not isolationists except insofar as we seek to
isolate ourselves completely from war. Yet we must remember
that so long as war exists on earth there will be some danger
that even the nation which most ardently desires peace may be
drawn into war. 36
After several graphic paragraphs on the horrors of war and the evils of
profiteering, he continued:
No matter how well we are supported by neutrality
legislation, we must remember that no laws can be provided
to cover every contingency, for it is impossible to imagine
how every future event may shape itself. In spite of every
possible forethought, international relations involve of
necessity a vast uncharted area. In that area safe sailing
will depend on the knowledge and the experience and the
wisdom of those who direct our foreign policy. Peace will
depend on their day-to-day decisions. 37
Significantly, while paying lip service to isolationism, Roosevelt hinted
that there were definite limits to the philosophy of conducting the affairs of
state by statute. Although this speech did not openly advocate international
cooperation, it did reveal the President's desire for a pragmatic approach to
foreign affairs, which could lead easily (and eventually did) to internation-
alism.
Almost as if to prove Roosevelt's implicit hypotheses, the old "ad hoc"
horse had to be dragged out of the legislative stable in response to the
alarms sounded by the Spanish Civil War. Much to the chagrin of interested
Washington, the Neutrality Act of 1936 was found to be not applicable to civil
wars. Stopgap legislation in the form of a joint resolution to embargo ship-
ments of arms, munitions, and implements of war to either side in the Spanish








As Roosevelt's first administration drew to a close, the theories of
neutrality and isolation were nominally the guiding precepts for the conduct
of foreign policies. In actual practice, however, political response to the
three wars (Chaco, Italo-Ethiopian, and Spanish) was determined on a case
basis.
American neutrality in both the Chaco War and the Spanish Civil War was
effectively proclaimed by legislation that was applicable only to the specific
conflict. To be sure, the 1935 Neutrality Act had been enacted by Congress
before the recognized outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War on October 3, 1935.
However, passage of the act remained in doubt until Secretary Hull reluctantly
recommended on August 29 that the President approve the compromise bill. Hull
later recorded in his memoirs that one of the reasons he finally favored
acceptance of the Neutrality Act was that "the nature of the war to which the
*38joint resolution would undoubtedly apply was already apparent. He also
realized that "the application of the neutrality resolution, in this case,
even though it imposed an embargo on both belligerents, could not but affect
*3q
the agressor, Italy, far more adversely than the victim, Ethiopia. y Thus the
impetus of the coming hostilities was influential in establishing the neutral-
ity legislation of 1935.
Although there was much emphasis on the merits of neutrality statutes by
the advocates of isolationism, there was, in fact, no instance involving the
vital questions of war and peace where the conduct of state had been dictated







Franklin D. Roosevelt began his second term as President of the United
40States with a vast reservoir of political capital and apparent popularity.
The expected emphasis on permanent neutrality legislation, however, did not
materialize, and, in fact, the Administration superficially divorced itself
from the legislative struggle.
The reason for the divorce, wrote Cordell Hull, was that the Administra-
tion believed that a more flexible act could be obtained from Congress without
41
a hard-sell approach. Senator Tom Connally, using a more poignant rationale,
maintained that Roosevelt could not afford an intimate involvement in a
neutrality battle because of a personally more important objective—increasing
42
the number of justices of the Supreme Court.
Hammered out on the floors of Congress, tacitly approved by the Adminis-
tration, and generally welcomed by a naive public, the permanent legislation
designed to keep America aloof from the evils of war became law on May 1, 1937.
The Nye isolationists feared that too much discretion remained in the Chief
Executive's hands and the Stimson-Davis-Hull internationalists believed that
too little was retained. Mandatory features of the Act, to be implemented
when the President determined that a state-of-war existed, were an embargo on
arms, a prohibition on travel on belligerent ships, and a ban on loans to
belligerents. The major discretionary feature was that the President was
empowered to place all non-arms trade with belligerents under a formula
40
Roosevelt was reelected by an overwhelming landslide of votes: over
eleven million in popular plurality, 523 to 8 ratio of electoral votes, and









popularly known as the "cash-and-carry" plan. Thus, by the middle of 1937,
American Foreign Policy, with specific regard to national peace and interna-
tional war, had become permanently subject to statutory limitations.
The complexity of the neutrality concept might be better appreciated by
reference to a brief analogy. Charles Warren provided a succinct description
of the "distinctly uncomfortable and precarious position" of the neutral
United States in international polity:
In a neighborhood of highly inflammable buildings, to rely
on the supposedly fireproof quality of one's own house, and
to make no effort to prevent a conflagration starting, is a
dangerous means of trying to "play safe." If, however, we are
determined to sit on the fence, surrounded by tanks of gasoline,
and to watch the match being scratched without taking any part
in trying to prevent it, then we ought to make pretty certain
beforehand, not only that the house into which we are going to
retire is fireproof, but also that the atmosphere will be such
that we can comfortably live in the house while the neighbor-
hood is ablaze. 44
The neutrality question, though quite important, was not the issue that
was absorbing the attention of the country for the first six months of 1937.
President Roosevelt was concentrating on domestic problems and consequently was
divesting his political capital at an enormous rate in his ill-fated attempt
to "pack" the Supreme Court. By the end of June 1937 national attention was
focused on the court fight. Internationally, the general public was content
to rest behind the false shield of neutrality.
43
Briefly, this plan required that title to all goods be transferred to
the receiver prior to shipment from the United States. This proposal was
initially formulated in Barnard M. Baruch, "Neutrality," Current History
,
Vol. XLIV (June 1936).
44
Charles Warren, "Congress and Neutrality, 1 Neutrality and Collective
Security (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1936), 153.
45
For a concise summary of the "court packing" battle see James
MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1956), 291-315.
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A crucial test of American Foreign Policy was about to begin with a
President whose self-confidence was receiving a damaging blow from what would
later be called his most decisive defeat in domestic legislation, and a vast
segment of the country deluded by an articulate and vociferous isolationist




MARCO POLO TO GENEVA: THE DEMISE
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Speaking before the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of
Virginia on July 7, 1937, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles said:
"...If war breaks out without this hemisphere, no matter how free from in-
volvement we may remain, we cannot stay clear of its consequences .. .we must
play our part, and our full part, in grappling with the disease which afflicts
mankind, before it is too late.... We can but express the anxious hope that
the sands in the hourglass have not yet run out. That very night time ran
out at the Marco Polo Bridge, near Loukouchiao (Wanping) about nine miles
southwest of Peiping. Responsibility for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident has
never been fixed, and it is of minor importance in itself. Perhaps the most
pertinent comment was made by the United States Ambassador to China, Nelson T.
Johnson. He wrote that he did not believe the incident was initiated by
either the Japanese Government or Army, but that the question of responsi-
bility was insignificant compared with the use that the Japanese were n
2
apparently going to make of it.
ow
The complete text of Mr. Welles' address, entitled "Present Aspects of
World Peace" is given in Documents on International Affairs
,
1937 edited by
Stephen Heald [hereafter cited as DIA 1937] (London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1939), 563-69.
2
U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States : Diplomatic
Papers
,
1937 [hereafter cited as FR 1937] (5 vols., Washington: U.S. Govt.
P.O., 1954), III, 170.
J. W. Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor: the Foreign Policies of
Japan," Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (July 1949), 654, provides a more
analytical approach to the "incident" by saying: "...It was a natural con-
sequence of [Japan's] fixed national policy calling for establishment of a
solid footing on the continent."
Excellent coverage of the 1937 Sino-Japanese Undeclared War can be found
in E. G. Hubbard, "The Far East" in the Survey of International Affairs , 1937
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On July 12, the State Department received information from both Chinese
and Japanese government officials on the situation in China, and, in turn,
3
expressed official concern that the conflict was a blow to world peace.
A brief announcement of these diplomatic exchanges was Washington's
first public comment concerning the hostilities. The text of the press
release, a separate statement emphasizing independent and parallel action, and
an appeal for "continuous and frank exchange of information" were all tele-
graphed to Ambassador Robert Bingham in the United Kingdom for the information
4
of the British Foreign Office. This communication was the first Washington-
London exchange on the Undeclared War and is significant only in that it
reiterated and gave emphasis to Washington's desire for separate but parallel
action.
Excluding China and Japan, the powers most noticeably interested in this
"Far Eastern Crisis" were the United States and Great Britain. The tone for
Anglo-American cooperation had been set in an informal exchange of ideas on
foreign policy one month prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Un-
declared War. Prime Minister Chamberlain saw that the basis for Europe's
troubles was fear of German aggression. He believed that some form of col-
laboration between the United States and the United Kingdom was required to
restore the world's confidence and avert the current menace. Chamberlain saw
that there was a very real possibility that Britain might be confronted
simultaneously with hostilities in Europe and the Far East, and that any move
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938); and Dorothy Borg, The United States and
the Far East Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964).
3







toward an Anglo-American-Japanese detente would be beneficial. In the mean-
-time, the greatest single contribution, thought the Prime Minister, that the
United States could make would be to amend the neutrality legislation to
distinguish between victim and aggressor.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull's response stressed economic aspects as
a means to advance welfare and thereby ease political tensions. More impor-
tantly, Hull set policy guidelines when he referred to establishing a
restraining influence in the Far East: "We believe that consultation between
and among the powers most interested, followed by procedure on parallel lines
and concurrently, tends to promote the effectiveness of such efforts."
Hull went on to reaffirm support for the principles listed in Article I of
the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, 1922, and to hint at future political
agreements with moral precepts similar to ones then in existence.
The first attempt to establish a united front opposed to the hostilities
in northern China ended in failure. Britain and France were prepared to urge
restraint and to hint at either mediation or an offer of good offices in both
Tokyo and Nanking. The United States was asked by Britain if she would be
Q
willing to cooperate in the joint approach. With Presidential approval,
6
Ibid ., I, 533.
Article I of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, 1922. "The Con-
tracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) To respect the sovereignty,
the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to
develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To
use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintain-
ing the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all
nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking
advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges
which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and
from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."
It is interesting to note the choice of the word "respect" in Item No.
(1) , and to speculate whether the course of history would have been different
had the Powers agreed to "guarantee" the sovereignty, independence, etc.
8
FR 1937, III, 158-59.
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the American reply endorsed the plan for implementation by the British. How-
ever, in declining the proposal, the United States said that separate action
9had already been taken. Acquiescing to Hull's suggestion, the British
dropped the plan and instructed their representatives to act independently
and not make the representation on an Anglo-French basis. Although this
initial diplomatic maneuver was not necessarily an ambitious one, it did
hold the prospect of expressing collective concern—if not security.
There was also a difference of opinion between British and American
officials in Japan as to what would be the best course of action. James
Dodds , British Charge 'd'Affaires , thought that direct representations might
be resented, but that inquiring whether the Western governments could be of
help would not hurt. Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador, reported that
he could see no reason why the United States should take any action.
The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was informed by Secretary Hull on
the night of July 13, that the United States "would confine its interests and
utterances to phrases entirely within the range of its impartial, friendly
attitude toward all alike; that in any event whatever it might now say...
12









Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era : A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years,
1904-1945 (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), II, 1040; and FR 1937,
III, 157.
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U.S. Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States: Japan. 1931-1941 [hereafter cited as FRJ 1931-1941] (2 vols.,
Washington: U.S. Govt. P.O., 1943), II, 321.
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the course of the conversation, Hull repeatedly expressed the desire of the
United States for peace and the deleterious effects that war would have on
the world. At this time there were still conflicting information and a
scarcity of facts about the situation in China. The meeting between Hull
and the Japanese Ambassador produced more mutual expressions of concern than
suggestions that could possibly alleviate the hostilities.
One of the factors that led to diplomatic confusion in the early stages
of the conflict was that Japan attempted to negotiate a settlement of the
"Incident" with local authorities in North China and not with the central
government in Nanking. Agreements for a cessation of hostilities and a with-
drawal of troops were approved by the Nanking Government, but political con-
13
cessions wrought from local officials were totally rejected. Restricted
skirmishes and continuing Sino-Japanese negotiations for several weeks led
many foreign observers to believe that prospects for localizing the dispute
were favorable. However, in reality both China and Japan were preparing for
combat on a much larger scale.
A week after the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, Ambassador Grew
reported from Japan that the situation had not developed enough to permit the
formulation of recommendations. He could see no course of action available
14
to the American Government that could be taken to any advantage. The
Ambassador emphasized that the Japanese-American relations were better when
action relevant to Sino-Japanese matters took the form of preserving American
13
For correspondence on the "local" agreements see FR 1937, III, 137 et
passim.
14
FR 1937, III, 166; and, Grew, II, 1043.
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rights in China rather than an endeavor to inhibit Japan's use of force.
Therefore, Grew expressed his belief that protests to the Japanese Government
should be made only in circumstances where the protest would not aggravate
the situation; or when American property and citizens' rights were directly
involved; or, finally, if humanitarian considerations made it necessary to
express official American concern.
A literal interpretation of Grew's opinion indicates that he advocated
appeasing Japan by the omission of any action when the narrowly defined
interests of the United States were not directly involved. This is important
to note because the same attitude is expressed periodically by several
governments up to and during the Brussels Conference.
The first substantial communication from the French Government was
received the night of July 15 in Washington. Yvon Delbos, France's Foreign
Minister, expressed his regret that a joint demarche' in Tokyo had not been
possible. He stated that since neither Great Britain nor the United States
seemed willing to intervene actively in the Far East, urging "counsels of
moderation" would probably be futile; however, if they were willing to inter-
vene actively, France would "cooperate to the fullest extent possible."
Delbos believed that it would be disastrous to the League of Nations if China
should call on the League to handle the dispute. The Foreign Minister added
that he had remarked in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador that,
1 f\




FR 1937, III, 174.
There is some confusion whether Delbos made this statement to the Chilean
Ambassador or the Chinese Ambassador. The telegram from France, which re-
ported the conversation, stated the "Chilean Ambassador." However, the




The message from Paris also included an appeal for American leadership. This
entreaty was phrased with the hope that Washington would initiate action in
accordance with the Nine Power Treaty.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1937 the Chinese made numerous state-
ments that were prophetic. One pronouncement, in the middle of July, was by
the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hsu Mo, to Willys R. Peck, the United
States Counselor of Embassy in China. Hsu Mo observed that a policy of
isolation from war might seem prudent, but a major conflict in the Far East
would entail serious world repercussions, and it would be difficult for the
United States to avoid involvement. He wondered whether an effort to obviate
such a conflict was not really the wiser course for the United States to
1 8
pursue. The beginning of a controversy, which was destined to plague Anglo-
American relations for many months, was noted when Hsu Mo said that the
British Government seemed more active during this crisis than the American




Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, 1922. "The
Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the
opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of
the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application,




FR 1937, III, 183.
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Reference is made to a relatively vigorous policy of "collective con-
demnation" of Japan advocated by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in 1932,
and Sir John Simon's failure to provide British cooperation. For a brief
account of this controversy see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, 1947), 235-39.
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By this time (July 16) , the cumulative pressures of requests from
Britain, France, China, and Japan compelled a clarification of the United
States position. Secretary Hull consulted President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and reached agreement on a statement of principles. The text was based in
part on the Democratic Party Platform of 1932, declarations made at the
Montevideo Conference in 1933, and the "Eight Pillars of Peace" program
20presented by Secretary Hull in 1936 in Buenos Aires. For the most part
the theme constituted moral advocasies and beliefs of the United States that
Hull considered as vital in international relations as the "Ten Commandments"
21
were in personal relations. The wording was carefully chosen and was
couched in broad terms to avoid labelling any nation as a violator of inter-
national morality. Copies of the text were communicated to foreign govern-
ments with a request for their comments. It was anticipated that the cumu-
lative effect of favorable replies would strengthen and revitalize standards
of behavior among nations.
Cordell Hull later recorded in his memoirs that several reasons prompted
him to reiterate the principles of moral conduct. The most important motive
was to educate Americans and to ease them away from the "slough of isolation
into which so many had sunk." He also thought that other nations might be
induced to adopt the tenets as the "cornerstone of their foreign policies."
20
Text given in Peace and War , 325-26.
Recognition of international responsibility was noted in the statements:
"There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one
way or another affect the interests or rights or obligations of this country
.... We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we
believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of





A third influence was the hope that people, who believed in the principles,
might object to or be resistant to aggressive governments. Finally, he felt
that if war came, people who were committed to the ideals would "swing back
to the right international road."
The issuance of the statement on July 16 was the first major foreign
policy step taken by the United States since the beginning of the Sino-
Japanese Undeclared War. Regardless of the intentions, this dictum was
interpreted by many governments, perhaps too optimistically, as a sign that
the United States would take a more active leadership role in stemming the
rapidly deteriorating international situation. On the other hand, Under
Secretary of State Welles thought that, "Such a communication ...merely
convinced the dictators that the United States would limit its interference
a »22to words.
Replies were eventually received from about sixty nations (including
Germany, Italy, and Japan) indicating a willingness to adhere to the
23
principles. The answer sent by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
22
Welles was definitely critical of Hull's statement. He admitted that
the principles were largely unassailable, but had been stated before and
"frequently in infinitely more eloquent and moving terms." Welles said that
what was needed was "some clear indication that the United States was willing
to act... and thus save those principles from oblivion." Sumner Welles, Seven
Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 10-12.
There was not a great amount of mutual admiration between the men occupy-
ing the number one and two positions in the State Department. Expressing
contempt for Hull's pronouncements in general, Welles stated: "Secretary
Hull's discourses to the foreign diplomats whom he received and to his
associates. . .always reminded me irresistably of the story of the Civil War
politician whose speeches—more notable for their length than for their con-
tent—were once likened to a train with twenty cars from which emerged but a
single passenger." Hull's passenger was Trade Agreements—a panacea for the
world's problems.
23
Text of the replies are printed in U.S. Dept. of State, The Department
of State Press Releases , July 3-December 25 , 1937 [hereafter cited as Press
Releases] (Washington: U.S. Govt. P.O., 1938), Vol. XVII, 87-107, 121-143,
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Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, stressed the "indivisability of peace and of
collective security." It also said that the present international situations
called for "the most energetic counteractivity on the part of all nations."
Also of interest was the Portugese reply which decried solving international
problems "by means of abstract formulae. .. the uselessness. . . [of which] has been
,,25
seen.
Perhaps the most succinct commentary on the international situation was
made by the British Charge' d' Affaires , James Dodds, to Japan's Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Kensuke Horinouchi, on the same day Hull released his
statement. Dodds said, "This is a moment for the statesmen and not the
n ! . i l|26
soldiers to control.
Two half-hearted attempts to initiate a political solution met with no
success. A British proposal calling for the cessation of all Japanese and
27
Chinese troop movements by July 17 was virtually ignored by both parties.
Equally futile were feelers put out by the French Government for action in
accordance with provisions of the Boxer Protocol, the Covenant of the League
O Q
of Nations, or the Nine Power Treaty.
167, 285.
Secretary Hull was irritated when Britain delayed in sending her
"reserved" reply. Under Secretary Welles wrote that he suspected Anthony
Eden "saw as little of practical value to be gained in signing the proffered
pledge as in officially reaffirming the validity of the Beatitudes." Welles,
10.
24




FR 1937, III, 188.
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Ibid. , III, 187 and 207
This proposal was due to the individual initiative and courageousness of
Dodds, who acted without orders from London. His action, subsequently
endorsed by his government, is an early example of Britain's willingness to
become involved, and Japan's unwillingness to limit hostilities. For the
details of this proposal see Grew, II, 1050-51.
28
FR 1937, III, 201, 205, 211, 223, 232-33.
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Since the outbreak of hostilities in China, press coverage in the United
States had been generally limited to factual reporting of events. Facts were
hard enough to come by. Many people either considered the incident to be a
local outbreak of violence or waited to see what would be Washington's
official response. Secretary Hull's formal statement of the United States
position, released on July 16 evoked a thoughtful article from Edwin L. James,
a prominent political analyst for the New York Times . Included in his
analysis of the conflict, James wrote:
It may be taken for granted that as long as the
participation of the United States in the situation
is limited to exhortations of peace, Tokyo will not
alter its intentions because of that. In fact, the
Japanese declared yesterday that the North China
situation was not an affair concerning the United
States. If we do nothing to distrub that analysis
of the situation, Tokyo may well judge that it is
safe enough to go ahead, so far as Washington is
concerned.^"
Without actually applying the label, Mr. James was sounding a warning in
the early stages of the war that the failure of Washington to act could result
in a policy of appeasement by omission.
Anthony Eden, who was at the time Secretary of Britain's Foreign Office,
became convinced that counsels of moderation in Tokyo and Nanking had very
little chance of success, especially when they were not presented in consort
31
by London and Washington. To strengthen the urgings , Eden proposed to
29
NYT, July 18, 1937, IV, 3.
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The first mention of appeasement in diplomatic correspondence relative
to the Undeclared War was reported by Ambassador Bingham in the record of a
conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden on July 19. Bingham wrote that Eden
said "he would welcome any suggestion from the American Government as to any
action which might tend towards appeasement. . .separate action by the two
Governments. . .would have at least greater weight than any action by his





Washington that an Anglo American appeal should be sent to the Japanese and
32
Chinese Governments. His plan was to ask the Japanese and Chinese: to
issue instructions that all further movements of troops be suspended; and,
to agree that the United States and Great Britain should put forward sug-
gestions in an attempt to end the deadlock.
While waiting for a reply to his proposal, Eden held several conversa-
tions with Robert Bingham, the United States Ambassador in London. Eden
emphasized that Britain had created the unfavorable impression in Japan of
being more interested than the United States Government in opposing Japanese
33
action in China, and was therefore reluctant to make any further move alone.
Bingham's response was that collaboration would be easier to obtain in the
Far East than in Europe, but Eden was not sure this was a very encouraging
distinction. Bingham also made an interesting, but unofficial, proposal to
Eden. In substance, he suggested that Britain ask the United States to join
34
in an embargo on all Japanese trade. Ambassador Bingham was acting appar-
ently on his own volition as there is no evidence that he was putting out a
feeler for Washington.
Secretary Hull had three main objections to the British proposal for a
35
united approach. First, the impression would be created in Tokyo that the
32
For diplomatic correspondence on this proposal see FR 1937, III, 226-
29 and 235-36.
33
For the substance of the conversation see Eden, 603-604.
34 T,.,Ibid .
Bingham reasoned that if some attempt was not made to stop Japanese
aggression the outcome would be a total loss for both Great Britain and the
United States of large investments in the Far East. Eden showed this pro-
posal to Prime Minister Chamberlain, who then remarked that he hoped iu would
not go any further as it smacked of sanctions which would antagonize Japan.







major Western nations were bringing pressure to bear on Japan. The second
was that any joint action should be by all nations having interests in the
Far East, or, better yet, by all peaceful nations in the world. The third
concern was that any joint action with the British would arouse the fears
and animosity of the isolationists. Hull further doubted that action with-
out a show of force, backed by the intention to use it if necessary, would
be of any avail. He also correctly thought that neither government was will-
ing to go that far.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs for the State Department, gave British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay,
an interim reply to Eden's suggested procedure. Lindsay was told that
military elements had taken control of the Japanese Government and that
nothing would stop them. Hornbeck also indicated that any joint diplomatic
action would only exacerbate the already desperate situation.
Washington's official rejection of the British proposal indicated that
the United States would continue to urge "self restraint" on both the
Japanese and Chinese Governments. Furthermore, China and Japan had been
invited to suggest any forms of assistance which they believed the United
37
States might usefully render. Washington asked London whether similar
representations by her might not prove helpful. Eden reluctantly acquiesced




Ibid. , 604-605; and, FR 1937, III, 236.
That same day, Secretary Hull told Hiroshi Saito, the Japanese Ambassador
in Washington, that the United States Government would do anything—short of
mediation— that would contribute to composing the differences between Japan
and China. Peace and War, 372.
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thought that "events made it plainer every day that polite diplomatic appeals
38
were being smoothly disregarded."
Hull's declination of the British offer resulted in a controversy be-
tween Great Britain and the United States over who was doing the most for
peace in the Far East. Secretary Hull showed British Ambassador Lindsay
several cables he had received that indicated London was implicitly blaming
the United States for failure of the British proposal for joint action. The
publicity was to the effect that France and Great Britain were willing to
pursue the plan if the United States was willing to join them. Regardless
of the merit of the charge, Hull took umbrage in it and proceeded to give the
39
British a lesson in diplomatic courtesy.
There is little doubt that the failure to take more positive action than
vocal condemnations and moral urgings of restraint can be construed as an
40
appeasement of Japan s aggression in northern China. Chiang Kai-shek
expressed his feelings in a message to Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., and President Roosevelt:
I am sorry that the United States did not co-
operate with England in an attempt to avert the
present crisis which could have been averted by
joint representation to Japan and China. China




See also Hull, I, 539, for some caustic remarks addressed to the
British Government for publicicly implying that the British project had
failed because of a non-cooperative United States.
40
Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the Foreign Policy Association,
held a similar view and publicly declared: "A policy of constant retreatinj
before aggression. . .means the end of international law and will eventually
endanger the defenses of the United States." NYT, July 25, 19 37, IV, 4.
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to cooperate with the United States in 1931 regarding
Manchuria and now Britain will long remember the failure
of the United States to cooperate. 41
The many ill feelings and recriminations resulting from the rejection of the
British proposal, however, must be remembered in the context of public senti-
42
ment in the United States. Strong sympathy for isolationism restricted the
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Chiang Kai-shek routed this communication via Professor J. Lossing Buck,
University of Nanking, to Secretary Morgenthau and President Roosevelt. The
unusual method of routing and designation of the addressees can be explained
partially by the inclusion of some financial matters in the message. How-
ever, the State Department was quick to note the impropriety of by-passing
established diplomatic channels. Hull responded with an explicit admonish-
ment to Buck and an implicit one to Chiang Kai-shek. For Hull's reply see
FR 1937, III, 471.
42
For an indication of public sentiment in the United States see above
Chapter I and W. H. Shepardson and W. 0. Scroggs, The United States in World
Affairs : An Account of American Foreign Relations
,
1937 (New York: Harper,
1938) , especially Chapters III and XI.
A strong reluctance by the American public to cooperate with Britain
was indicated when the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll)
reported in the fall of 1937 that 88% of the people questioned rejected the
idea of going to war to help Britain if she became involved in the war in
China. Hadley Cantril, ed. , Public Opinion , 1935-1946 [hereafter cited as
Public Opinion ] prepared by Mildred Strunk (Princton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1951), 780.
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A typical staunch isolationist/neutralist reaction to the war in China
was Congressman Hamilton Fish's public urging that all U.S. troops, ships, and
rights in China be withdrawn. NYT, July 22, 1937, 10.
The lack of a clear mandate from the people to become involved in the
Sino-Japanese Conflict was also indicated by a survey which showed that the
American public was about evenly divided between being sympathetic to China
and having no sympathy for either side




However, in the October sample, 63% of the 59% sympathetic to China stated
that their sympathy would not deter them from buying Japanese goods. George
Gallup and Claude Robinson, "American Institute of Public Opinion—Surveys,
1935-1938," Public Opinion Quarterly , Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1938), 389.
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There was a relative lull in hostilities in northern China at this
time, but Chiang Kai-shek stated his belief on July 25 that the only way to
avert war between China and Japan would be by cooperative action on the part
of the United States and Great Britain along more vigorous lines than had
44been previously attempted. The Generalissimo felt that the United States
and Great Britain were the only powers in a position to make Japan understand
that China would rather fight than make further concessions. After mention-
ing the moral obligations of the two great powers under the Nine Power Treaty,
Chiang went on to say that America's interest in world peace and general
concern for the welfare of humanity should dictate an immediate cooperation
with the British Government to persuade Japan to avoid an all out war.
Ambassador Grew telegraphed to Washington that in his opinion the action
recommended by Chiang Kai-shek would not affect developments favorably, nor,
45
in fact, would any foreign diplomatic representations.
Ambassador Nelson Johnson was "much impressed" with the "logical force"
of the Generalissimo's arguments, but the Far Eastern Division of the Stace
Department concurred with Grew, and added that developments could probably
46
be affected only if actions carried some implications of sanctions.
On the night of July 25 fighting resumed along the Tientsin-Peiping rail
line. Within a few days the Chinese were defeated, and the Japanese were in
control of the Tientsin-Peiping region.
44




, III, 280; and, Grew, 1068.
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FR 1937, III, 280.
In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Dr. Hornbeck wrote: "Nothing
short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great
foreign powers that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the
equation would appreciably affect the play of force (forces) which is now
taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield."
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In view of the increasing hostilities, Eden renewed his July 20 proposal
47
for a joint Anglo-American approach to the Japanese and Chinese Governments.
This offer met with no more success than the original one and the attempt was
dropped. Again a course of action had been proposed, which might have affected
subsequent developments, but it could not be implemented because of the fear
of the consequences.
By the end of July the Japanese were consolidating their position in
North China, and the Chinese were preparing to reist Japanese aggression in-
48definitely. The Western Powers were hoping but not expecting that the
hostilities would be confined to the North China region. When asked by
Secretary Hull if he thought that the fighting would continue and spread,
49
Dr. Hornbeck replied in the affirmative on both counts.
Early in August, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Shanghai
region, London and Washington considered various methods of making an offer
of good offices to Tokyo and Nanking. The original plan was sponsored by the
British but the method finally agreed upon came from recommendations made by
Ambassador Grew. He could not "conscientiously recommend against a final
effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good
offices...." Grew thought the Japanese should be approached separately,
orally, in an informal manner, with as little publicity as possible, and from
47
Ibid., Ill, 286. See also footnote 32 above.
Chiang Kai-shek announced on July 29 that "Henceforth absolutely no
local settlement will be possible." The Undeclared War now had become a
matter of China's national survival. FR 1937, III, 298-99.
49
Ibid ., Ill, 310.
Ibid.,, Ill, 340-41 (for more information on this proposal see also
319, 327-29, 339, 350-51, 353, 372-73).
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a non-intervention attitude. He also stated that he should like to feel
"that history will regard the record of American action in this most critical
and pregnant period in Far Eastern affairs as exhaustive, unstintedly helpful
and impartially correct." However, events at Shangai soon outran the chances
for success of the offer of good offices and the proposal was not pursued.
On August 13 fighting began at Shanghai and the danger to international
interests became more apparent. Ambassador Johnson had reported to Washington
that a proposal' for pacifying Shanghai had been discussed favorably in col-
laboration with the Ambassadors from Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.
Johnson had recommended that the United States cooperate in this effort; how-
ever, the consuls in Shanghai soon reported to Nanking that under the exist-
ing circumstances the plan was "impractical" and was therefore not being
51
undertaken.
The diplomatic initiative was again seized by the British. They sug-
gested that both China and Japan withdraw their armed forces from the Shanghai
area, and the protection of Japanese nationals in the area would then be under-
taken by the Western Powers. France was willing to cooperate, but the United
States refused. In rejecting the British proposal the United States cate-
gorically stated: "It should not be expected that this Government would be
favorably inclined toward any project envisaging military or police responsi-
bilities over and above those which relate to the already existing missions...
52
now present in China." The reply to the British plan was preceded by a
press release on August 17 that also emphasized that the "question of force
51
Ibid. , III, 419-20 and 445-46.
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was entirely out of mind." Statements of this nature could hardly fail to
encourage an aggressive and determined country like Japan. At a minimum,
such declarations provided some latitude within which the Japanese could feel
free to pursue their political and military objectives.
The battle for Shanghai, precipitated by the shooting of a Japanese naval
officer and a seaman at the Hungjao airport, soon grew to full-scale combat.
The increased scope of hostilities added pressure on President Roosevelt to
make a decision whether or not to invoke the Neutrality Act. Senator Nye,
speaking for the isolationists, called for an immediate declaration of
54
neutrality and evacuation of all American interests from Shanghai.
Senator Pittman, adopting the Administration's view, urged delay in pro-
claiming neutrality.
Secreatry Hull outlined, during an August 17 press conference, the at-
titude taken by the Washington Government. He explained that the position
taken was between two extreme viewpoints : "One is the view of extreme inter-
nationalism, which rests upon the idea of political commitments. We keep
entirely away from that in our thoughts and views and policies, just as we
seek, on the other hand, to keep entirely away from the extreme nationalists
who would tell all Americans that they must stay here at home«..'" The
33
FRJ 1931-1941, I, 349-53.
On the floor of the Senate, J. Hamilton Lewis, a Senator from Illinois,
demanded that the United States refuse to cooperate with Great Britain. NYT,
August 17, 1937, 3.
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NYT, August 15, 1937, 29.
Senator William E. Borah, former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and a long-time isolationist, parochially advocated adoption
of any policy to keep out of the conflict: "The world seems determined to
commit suicide by more wars and more armaments and more taxes.... I think we
can longest preserve our civilization by staying out of it." Ibid . , 29.
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Secretary of State also took advantage of the press conference to forestall
charges that American citizens were being abandoned by their government. He
announced that 1,200 marines were being shipped from San Diego to Shanghai
57
to provide protection for American interests.
The problem of American interests in Shanghai occasioned some sharp
policy debates in the August cabinet meetings. The China situation, ex-
plained Hull, was very complicated. To withdraw in an orderly manner in
agreement with other nations would be given one interpretation in Tokyo, but
the Japanese would consider a "scuttling departure" to be a signal indicating
58
a complete retreat by America from the Pacific. When the Vice President,
John Nance Garner, objected that the United States was risking involvement in
a war for the sake of business, Secretary Hull said that ultimately all major
powers should withdraw from China and that he planned, if necessary, to
59
assume the lead in doing so. President Roosevelt ended the discussion by
saying that American policies were based "on the hope of a Japanese disaster,
37
FR 1937, III, 430; and, Hull, I, 540.
Provisions included in the Boxer Protocol of 1901 permitted the station-
ing of foreign troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area for the purpose of main-
taining the lines of communication to the sea. The number of troops was
generally limited to a few hundred for each foreign power, but, by the start
of the Sino-Japanese Conflict, Japan had expanded her "peace-keeping" forces
to about 6,000 troops. United States forces numbered 500 at Peiping, 700 at
Tientsin, and approximately another 1,000 at Shanghai in the International
Settlement.
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A public opinion survey indicated that 54% of the people questioned were
in favor of withdrawing all troops from China to keep from getting involved
in the fighting. Leaving troops in China to protect American citizens was
advocated by 46%. Cantril, Public Opinion , 774.
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which could be produced by a rise in the strength of Russia and China, and a
revolt on the part of the Japanese population against militarism."
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes summarized the situation by
saying that it was the "old case of not doing something when it can be done
and then when a crisis arises deciding it can't be done. But there isn't any
more doubt," continued Ickes, "than there ever has been that the President
ft 1
desires peace above everything else." After the cabinet meeting, Ickes
wrote in his diary that Hull seemed obsessed with the notion that if we did
certain things or refrained from doing certain things the Japanese would
"insult us;" Hull's attitude toward Japan, Ickes thought, seemed entirely
different from his view of other countries.
Thus by the middle of August the Administration found itself in the
increasingly uncomfortable position of witnessing a de facto, even if not de
jure, war in the Far East. Foreign Policy direction, at least at the Chief
Executive's level, was being based on the tenuous hope for a "Japanese
Blum, Years of Crisis , 481.
The hope for a disaster was predicated on underestimations of the
strength of Japan's economy and nationalistic spirit. Many observers errone-
ously believed that Japan's economy could not support a major war effort with-
out risking a domestic revolt. Ambassador Grew and Sir Robert Craigie,
Britain's Ambassador to Japan, thought that if the moderate elements in the
Japanese Government were encouraged they might be able to wrest control from
the militarists and return Japan to more peaceful days. This also was
proved to be wishful thinking. Some diplomatic correspondence on Grew's and
Craigie' s views is presented in FR 1937, III, 48-52, 74-75, 402, 486.
Harold L. Ickes, The Inside Struggle , 1936-1939 [Vol. II of The Secret




The question of "face" was very important to the Japanese. The Japanese
Ambassador to France, Yotaro Sugimura, stated that as a matter of principle
Japan's position could not be defended, but, he stated, "We must remember
that as one traveled eastward from Europe principle became less important and
prestige became more and more important." FR 1937, III, 326.
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disaster." Parallel and independent diplomatic reaction (as opposed to
action) was being faithfully practiced; in fact, the most clearcut and
well-adhered-to decision to date had been the commitment to avoid any
entangling alliances.
A particularly embarrassing point for the Administration was the unused
Neutrality Act. Unofficial but very real sympathy for China's cause was
held in Washington. Unfortunately the Neutrality Act, designed for a
European war, favored a maritime power such as Japan. Roosevelt did not
want to prejudice unduly China's capability ro resist Japan's aggression, and
he therefore was refusing to invoke the Act despite some public outcry for
neutrality. In response to a question at an August 17 press conference about
the invocation of Neutrality, Roosevelt said that "things are on a 24-hour
. . „63basxs.
Toward the end of August the United States took a major diplomatic step
64
by releasing a statement on policy. Briefly, this pronouncement made the
principles of international morality as set forth in the previous statement
on July 16 directly applicable to the Far East. The general reaction in
diplomatic capitals around the world to Hull's latest initiative was aptly
summarized by the Tribune de Geneve ; "In reality the United States will
intervene in the conflict only so far as its material interests are
threatened.... From the point of view of the State Department's last two
63
FR 1937, III, 442.
Roosevelt was technically correct in his refusal to declare United
States Neutrality. Invocation of the Act depended upon the President finding
that a state-of-war existed: neither Japan nor China had actually declared
war. However, Roosevelt's action in this regard was in marked contrast to
the speed with which he recognized a state-of-war and declared neutrality in
the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War. (War had not been declared
by the belligerents in these conflicts either.)
64
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initiatives, contrary to the objectives they profess, prove once more that
one must not count on the active participation of the United States in the
general organization of a collective defense of peace. In short, these
ritual manifestations mark a new retreat from the defunct Kellogg-Briand
Pact, which had already in American eyes only symbolic, sentimental value."
The day following that on which Hull released his latest plea for inter-
national morality the indefatigable British made an "urgent" appeal to
Washington for a joint approach to China and Japan to declare Tsingtao a
"safety area." The reply to this request stated that the United States




Six weeks had passed since the outbreak of hostilities in the undeclared
war. Throughout this period there had been a noticeable want of political
solidarity among the Western Powers. This lack of a united opposition could
only enhance Japan's diplomtic and military position in China. The failure
by nations, either collectively or singularly, to take positive action to
resolve the conflict was tantamount to an acquiescence in Japanese aggression:
"Appeasement by Omission." Paradoxically, however, an editorial in the New
York Times stated at this time that it was impossible to interpret Secretary
of State Cordell Hull in any other way than that the independence and
integrity of China remained a goal of United States diplomacy.
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Another opportunity was presented to end the policy of appeasement to-
ward Japan in the closing days of August. The French Government proposed a
united appeal for peace in the Far East, and was prepared to "cooperate in
69
any maneuver. . .even though it might involve the use of force." In making
this proposal, Yvon Delbos indicated that the Russians would aid any effort
if their support was desired; in fact, they had informed him (Delbos) that
they would "threaten the Japanese with intervention" if they received approval
from either England, France, or the United States. Delbos made an interest-
ing point when he said that Britain, France, and the United States should
stop the present war, otherwise there was the possibility that the Far East
would become Facist under Japan or Communist under Russia. Delbos also
mentioned that China was ready to appeal to the League of Nations. These
provocative comments, made by France's Foreign Minister, triggered a response
from Hull which stated, in part, that "we do not intend to initiate a concert
of effort in regard to the Far East...."
The French press editorialized, probably in response to their Govern-
ment's offer, that, "If the United States decides to take more than passive
interest in Chinese affairs there is every reason to believe that she can
count upon backing from the European Continent and Great Britain." The
article continued to say that there was very little hope that any other
country would take the lead in calling a halt to Japanese aggression if the
United States remained aloof.
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The battle for Shanghai continued on into September. The Japanese were
looking for a decisive victory. The Chinese were mounting a surprisingly
effective resistance, and were looking for friends. The United States was
looking for good publicity and ways to avoid involvement. The other inter-
ested powers were looking to the United States for leadership that was not
forthcoming.
Following close upon the heels of Roosevelt's Supreme Court Defeat, an
economic recession began that was to absorb the major share of the President's
72
attention. The decline in stock market prices was so drastic that it was
comparable to any similar period during Hoover's unfortunate years in the
White House. Raymond Moley, a former intimate of the President's has vividly
described the effect of the recession on Roosevelt: "The crisis that set in
during September, 1937, provided, in fact, the most spectacular demonstration
of presidential irresolution since the days when Hoover had stood nonplused
73before some of the same ugly economic realities."
Concurrent with this latest domestic crisis, government officials were
beginning to realize some harsh realities pertinent to foreign affairs. In
early September Ambassador Johnson wrote, warning the State Department, that
a "too complaisant surrender" of our vested interests now "may precipitate a
more violent effort at recovery later." Secretary Morgenthau had come to
the same conclusion through the efforts of his research division in the
72
Adding to Roosevelt s discomfiture was a storm of controversy which
arose over the nomination of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court to
succeed Justice Willis Van Devanter. Opposition to Black because of his New
Deal liberalism was bolstered by categorical proof that the Senator had been
a member of the Klu Klux Klan— a charge neither confirmed or denied during
confirmation hearings.
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Treasury Department. Morgenthau predicted accurately the results of a policy
of appeasement: "In the long run... a Japanese victory would greatly increase
the chance of a general world war, if only by encouraging other facist
nations to aggression. Germany was quite prepared to fish in troubled waters;
and should Japan achieve success, the probability of a German move against
Czechoslovakia would become great." Perhaps the strongest sentiment was
expressed by the Secreatary of the Navy, Claude Swanson, at a cabinet meeting.
Swanson said that his staff was of the opinion that if it was considered
necessary to put Japan in its place, now was the time to do it while she was
so heavily occupied in China. However, Roosevelt countered that he was a
77
pacifist and had no intention of making a warlike move.
After the Cabinet concluded its meeting, Roosevelt and Ickes continued
a discussion on the international situation in the President's office. Ickes
told Roosevelt that he thought Hull was becoming altogether too timid. "The
President said I [Ickes] was right and that he had about come to the con-
clusion that he [Roosevelt] would have to take the ball in international
relationships from Hull."'° Ickes told the President it was his duty, as he
was the only one who could mold or lead world public opinion for the demo-
cratic ideal.
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Ickes, 211.
Two months later, after the sinking of the USS Panay
,
Ickes, himself,
posed the question: "Certainly war with Japan is inevitable sooner or later,





Ickes wrote in his diary after the same cabinet meeting his impression
of the Secretary of State: "Hull has become so timid that he tries to walk




With the war in a temporary stalemate over the battle for Shanghai,
national attention was directed momentarily toward actual and possible mari-
time incidents. Already one sailor had been killed when the USS Augusta was
struck by a shell of "unknown origin," and the ocean liner President Hoover
had been bombed mistakenly by a Chinese aviator. A source of possible fric-
tion with Japan was her establishment of a "blockade" against Chinese
shipping: ships sailing under other flags were exempted with the exception
that Japan reserved the right to establish the nationality of any vessel.
Against this backdrop, a controversy arose (inflamed by isolationist notables
and press) over the sailing of the merchant ship Wichita
,
bound for China with
•
- i u a 79nineteen warplanes on board.
Since the Wichita was owned by the United States, officials in Washington
were afraid that an "incident" reminiscent of World War I days might occur if
the vessel was stopped by the Japanese patrol that was blockading China's
coast. To avert the possibility of a problem, President Roosevelt released
the following statement on September 14:
Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the
United States will not hereafter, until further
notice, be permitted to transport to China or Japan any
of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war which were
listed in the President's proclamation of May 1, 1937
[Neutrality Act].
Any other merchant vessels, flying the American
flag, which attempt to transport any of the listed
articles to China or Japan will, until further notice,
do so at their own risk.
The question of applying the Neutrality Act remains
in statu quo, the Government policy remaining on a 24-
hour basis. 80
79
The planes were off-loaded at San Pedro, California on September 16,
and the Wichita finally made it to China with another cargo. Ultimately the
airplanes also arrived in China via Europe on a foreign bottom. For more on the
Wichita see NYT, September 15, 1937, 1; September 17, 1937, 4; and October
28, 1937, 4.
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Tliis statement is as close as the President ever came to an outright
declaration of neutrality in the Undeclared War. Roosevelt's carefully chosen
words represent a remarkably sophisticated and adroit piece of diplomacy.
Several objectives were served by the pronouncement. First, the onus was
removed from the Government for any maritime incident involving the shipment
of arms to the belligerents: this was accomplished without shutting off the
trade for those who might think the profit would be worth the risk. Second,
and quite important, the isolationists were moderately appeased by the new
state of pseudo-neutrality. Third, the rigors and consequences of the full
Neutrality Act were avoided, and the President's international hands remained
relatively free to operate in the pragmatic manner which he so desired.
Finally, both Japan and China were warned subtely that the Government's
policy was quite flexible and subject to change on very short notice.
Unfortunately, the President's September 14 announcement had two dele-
terious side effects. The Chinese Ambassador called upon Secretary Hull to
express his Government's disappointment that such a policy, which added to
China's difficulties, would be adopted by the United States. "When a friend
suddenly pursues a course which injures his friend," stated the Ambassador,
"the injured party cannot but feel that there is some deliberate intent.
On the other hand, the pronouncement was warmly received in Japan. An
editorial in the Japanese newspaper, Asahi, reported: "It is clear that the
President's order reveals determination to prevent the United States from be-
coming involved in the conflict.... We place a favorable interpretation on the
President's action. It indicates the folly of the efforts of China at Geneva
and elsewhere to secure the assistance of the United States."
TIull tried to mollify the Ambassador by telling him how bad things could
have been had the full Neutrality Act been implemented.
82Quoted in Grew, II, 1135.
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The interpretation given to fact is more important than the fact itself
—
a diplomatic verity. Consequently, if the Japanese chose to evaluate the
restrictions on American arms shipments as an acquiescence in their favor,
regardless of Roosevelt's motives, the declared state of pseudo-neutrality
had indeed become an act of "appeasement by omission."
The Sino-Japanese Conflict entered upon a new phase at about the same
time as Americans were discussing the ethics of the Wichita case and Ickes
was urging the President to make his voice heard in international affairs.
The Chinese Government took the step that had been long anticipated and
feared by several other governments—invocation of Article 10, 11, and 17 of
the Covenant of the Leauge of Nations coupled with an appeal to the Council
to advise upon the appropriate procedures and actions to be taken in accord-
oo
ance with the Articles.
The League of Nations recognized that any successful action would depend
essentially upon participation by the United States. Wary of becoming
entangled with the League of Nations, Secretary Hull cabled to Leland
Harrison, the United States Minister in Switzerland: "It appears to us an
eminently tenable position that some fifty states [League members] should
make up their minds and express themselves on a given problem before any one
o o
In July French Foreign Minister Delbos stated that "he was definitely
opposed to an appeal by China to the League of Nations. The League of Nations
today was a cipher and the only result of a Chinese appeal would be the cipher
would become the shadow of a cipher." FR 1937, IV, 2.
In essence, the three Articles: reminded the League of its obligation
to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of one of
its members against aggression; called for appropriate action to safeguard the
peace of nations, and required that a non-member (Japan) be invited to accept
the obligations of membership, whereupon the sanctions of Article 16 would
be applicable, and if the non-member would refuse and resort to war then the




state, outside of their organization, is asked to commit itself."
The key to United States involvement lay in its membership on the Far
Eastern Advisory Committee. This committee had been established early in
1933 in response to the crisis which grew out of the Mukden Incident and
Japan's subsequent invasion of Manchuria. The Advisory Committee had
remained in being, ostensibly to follow the Far Eastern situation and provide
a means for reconsidering the problem. This reconstituted organization met
on September 21. One of the first considerations was the establishment of a
subcommittee composed of the most interested powers—aimed at the signees of
the Nine Power Treaty— to investigate the charges submitted by China.
Leland Harrison was authorized to sit on the League committees in the
limited capacity of an observer.
The first several days of the sessions in Geneva embraced a lot of talk
but very few decisions. The conclusion was reached by most international
observers that no strong verdict against Japan could be possible until there
was some indication that the United States would be willing to make a mean-
ingful commitment to some form of collective action. Unanimity was achieved,
however, on September 27 with the adoption of a resolution condemning Japanese
bombing of open cities in China. The recent slaughter of civilians in air
raids on Nanking prompted the declaration that "no excuse can be made for such
acts which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world, and
[the Advisory Committee ] solemnly condemns them."
To forestall criticism that the United States was restraining the efforts




Complete text printed in FR 1937, IV, 38.
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some statement or reaction from Washington, Hull sent further instructions to
Harrison to emphasize the action that the United States already had taken in
support of the July 16 and August 23 policy statements. Harrison was also
told to be explicit in pointing out that independent and parallel action was
favored by America. The Minister was to suggest that other nations might




While the League was considering what course to take, the British queried
the United States Government about the possibility of joining them in spon-
soring some form of economic boycott against Japan. The official British
attitude was that they would consider the boycott or any other move likely to
curtail the present conflict. The United States reply indicated that such a
sanction had been considered but that that was about as far as action would
«= .1 - 87go for the present.
With diplomatic activity quietly centered on London's boycott proposal,
the international military and political battlefields were otherwise rela-
tively serene in the last week of September and the first few days of October
1937. The calm, which was more superficial than real, was being punctured
sporadically by thought-provoking analysis beamed to the world via the com-
munications media.
In a press conference held on September 24, Chiang Kai-shek accused the
United States and the other signatories of violating their obligations under
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Some support for a boycott was demonstrated when Roosevelt was shown a
long list of items that Japan would no longer permit to be imported so as to
conserve her financial resources. Roosevelt wondered if the list might not
justify forbidding imports of an equivalent value. He thought that this would




the Nine Power Treaty. He predicted that eventually the United States would






of xnternational law and justice.
Dr. A. J. de Querredo, from Ecuador, expressed the unspoken sentiment of
many small countries: "When the truth strikes in the eyes, we must condemn
89
aggression promptly." He argued that if the League did not give moral sup-
port to China, a large country where several great powers had extensive
interests, what hope was left for weaker members of the League.
A meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences
resulted in an excellent forum for the expression of views on the international
situation. Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell, in an address distinctly critical of the
Administration's Far East policy, called for "positive action" in cooperation
with other nations. He asserted that the resulting risks would be no greater
than those presently existing, and that the effect might end "present world
anarchy." He said that it was a "pure delusion" to think that there was
90
safety in continental isolation. At the same gathering, George Soule, who
was the editor of the New Republic and generally regarded as a spokesman for
the left, declared: "...any program of positive action involves certain risks,
but these risks are not greater than arise out of our present policy; what is
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For a more complete report of Dr. Buell' s statements see NYT, October
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The President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr.
Nicholas Murray Butler, cited the "contemptuous disregard" Japan had for her
treaty obligations in China. Dr. Butler continued in his radio address to
state that the choice facing mankind was either "the rule of moral principle
92
or world ruin."
Numerous laments for the fate of the world in a society of anarchistic
nation-states were being expressed in the apparent reality of a complete and
final collapse of the collective security philosophy for maintenence of world
peace. While these prophets of doom waited for the announcement of the "last
rites" in Geneva, President Roosevelt was putting the finishing touches on a
speech that would jolt the world into thinking that collective security might
not only survive, but indeed serve society well.




QUARANTINE TO BRUSSELS: HOPE AND DISILLUSIONMENT
A major diplomatic speech, often referred to as a "watershed" in American
foreign policy, arose from a proposal initiated jointly by the Tennessee
Diplomats: Cordell Hull and Norman H. Davis. Knowing that the President's
concern over the economic recession prompted Roosevelt to schedule a cross-
country trip for a personal "look-see" at the domestic situation, Hull and
Davis suggested the opportunity be used to make a speech promoting internation-
al cooperation. Furthermore, they thought, the speech should be given in a
large city in the isolationist heart of the country. President Roosevelt
responded with enthusiasm to both ideas.
In Chicago on October 5, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered
his famous "Quarantine Speech." The speech said, in part, that:
The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in
opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignor-
ings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of
international anarchy and instability from which there is no
escape through mere isolation or neutrality.... It seems to
be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness
is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to
spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of
the patients in order to protect the health of the community
against the spread of the disease.... The will for peace on
the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the
end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agree-
ments and the rights of others will desist from such action.
There must be positive measures to preserve peace.
1
International reaction to the "Quarantine Speech" followed the lines of
the military alliances for World War II. Germany, Italy, and Japan were
generally reserved in their comments, but tended to discount that any action
would result from the speech. France, China, and Russia were very hopeful
"'"Complete text given in FRJ 1931-1941, I, 379-99.
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and enthusiastic that the speech was presaging a role of international
cooperation for the United States. The British reaction was one of guarded
optimism; they were dubious that the speech was a call for action, and feared
2
that it merely expressed an attitude.
On one hand the British were pessimistic that the United States was now
advocating collective action for collective security. After three months of
appeals for Anglo-American cooperation, with not much more success than polite
diplomatic rebuffs, the London Government was naturally dubious. On the other
hand, they remembered a conversation in March 1937 between Ambassador Bingham
and Foreign Secretary Eden during which Bingham delivered a personal message
from his President: "The Ambassador said it was quite true that President
Roosevelt had been contemplating some initiative to attempt to better the
present international situation.... President Roosevelt was not only ready
but eager to help, that he would be ready to take an initiative if and when we
3
thought the moment right...." Perhaps it was on this optimistic note that
Prime Minister Chamberlain, addressing a Conservative Party Conference at
Scarborough, said that the Quarantine Speech was a "clarion call from the
4
other side of the Atlantic, as welcome as it was timely in its utterances."
Chamberlain went on to pledge the whole-hearted cooperation of the British
Government in any concerted effort for the goal of peace.
2
See NYT, October 7, 1937, 13-14.
Prince Konoye's eldest son, who was in his senior year at Princeton,
interpreted the speech as a "face saving" device for the President. NYT,
October 8, 1937, 5.
3
Eden, 599.
Bingham told Eden that the time {March 1937] for the initiative was not
yet, but that an alert watch should be kept so the right moment was not
overlooked.
Extracts from Chamberlain's speech are printed in DIA, 1937, 49.
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The initial domestic reaction to Roosevelt's speech is hard to evaluate.
On the surface it was generally enthusiastic. One of the main difficulties
in assessing the public response is that there was a lack of official inter-
pretation or clarification of the President's remarks. In a celebrated press
interview (the day after the Chicago address) with Ernest K. Lindley the
President was extremely vague and non-committal about the intent of his speech.
When asked if the speech repudiated neutrality, Roosevelt replied: "Not for a
minute. It may be an expansion."
Secretary Morgenthau recorded in his diary that the President was prob-
ably not sure himself what he meant to imply by the speech but that he did
not, as Roosevelt later explained, have sanctions in mind. Secretary Hull
was surprised at the wording of the "Quarantine Speech" and thought that the
effects of it would set back six months the public education campaign towards
o
international cooperation. Hull later recorded in his memoirs that he
thought isolationist reaction to the speech "emboldened the agressor countries.
and caused the democracies in Europe to wonder if we could ever be with them
9in more than words."
See NYT, October 6, 1937, 17-18, for comments from around the country.
Even Senator Borah hailed the speech. In a survey of sixteen editorial opin-
ions from various newspapers: nine responded favorably to the President's
call for internationalism; two were definitely hostile; and five were either
neutral in opinion or questioned what the significance of the remarks was.
Senator Pittman said that the conflict could be ended in thirty days by
establishing an economic quarantine of Japan (NYT, October 7, 1937, 1).
On October 8, the AFL and Transport Workers Union called for boycotts
of Japanese goods (NYT, October 8, 1937, 1 and 8).
Quoted in Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper,
1952), 167-68.







The motives behind the "Quarantine Speech" remain a mystery. Roosevelt's
secretary, Grace Tully, recalled working with the President on the speech:
"From his first words on this evening it was evident that Mr. Roosevelt in-
tended the Chicago speech to be a significant commitment...." When Roosevelt
returned to the train after the speech, remembered Miss Tully, "he had the air
of having made a profound decision and commitment—and of being glad the step
was taken."
Under Secretary of State Welles has alluded to the possibility that the
"Quarantine" idea was the outgrowth of a conversation he had with the President
12
in the early part of the summer of 1937. During the discourse, Roosevelt
talked about the possibility of erecting a naval barrier around Japan if she
did not cease her policy of conquering the rest of Asia.
Ambassador William Phillips, while on a short leave of absence from his
post in Italy, met with President Roosevelt at Hyde Park the day after the
Chicago speech. Phillips has reported part of the conversation in his mem-
oirs: "He [Roosevelt] had searched for a word which was not 'sanctions' and
had settled upon 'quarantine' as a word indicating a 'drawing away from some-
one.' However in developing this thought, he indicated to me a willingness to
c A -13go very far xn drawxng away....
And so the speculation about the President's motives continues.
Most historical analysts attribute Roosevelt's subsequent backing away
from what appeared to be a strong commitment for positive action to the






Sumner Welles was very enthusiastic about the speech. He later wrote
that he was shocked at the lack of support others in the Administration gave
to the President in this cause. Ibid . , 13.
13




isolationist backlash in response to the speech. The evidence to support
14
overwhelming rejection of international cooperation is tenuous at best.
An interesting addendum to the "Quarantine Speech" was the formulation of
a world peace plan under the chief sponsorship of Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles. The initial proposal was outlined for the President in a
memorandum from Mr. Welles dated October 6, 1937. After several refinements,
the plan evolved into two distinct stages. The first stage was to be dramati-
cally introduced, without prior notice, by Roosevelt during Armistice Day
ceremonies. At that time, the President would summon all of the foreign
diplomatic representatives to the White House. When the diplomats had con-
greated, he would make an emotional appeal concerning the need to preserve
world peace. He also would announce that the United States was prepared to
assume a position of leadership in any move to halt the drift into war. All
governments would then be asked to agree upon standards of international con-
duct, means of ensuring conduct, methods to achieve real disarmament, ways to
enforce humanitarian rules of warfare, and procedures for all nations to gain
equal economic opportunities.
14Roosevelt fully expected that his speech would provoke an emotional out-
cry from the isolationists. Expecting a "con" reaction, the President may
have given more credence to his pessimistic barometers than to the generally
"pro" reaction reported in the press. This theme is expanded and documented
in Dorothy Borg, "Notes On Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," Political Science
Quarterly
,
Vol. LXXII (September 1957), 405-33.
A survey of thirteen newspaper reactions to the speech indicated that
seven generally approved and six had unfavorable reactions. The six included
those which deplored the President's ambiguity and apparent lack of candor,
and were not necessarily against the principle of involvement, Literary Digest
(October 30, 1937), 12.
•^The "plan" is discussed in greater detail in Welles , 15-30
l"The memorandum is printed in William L. Langer and S. Ever
The Challenge to Isolation (New York: Harper, 1952), 20-21.
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The second stage would be implemented if the nations accepted the
Armistice Day proposal. In this phase of the plan the President would invite
nine representative nations—mostly smaller ones which were not involved in
any of the European or Asiatic controversies— to cooperate with the United
States in forming an agenda to cover the major points enumerated in the Armi-
stice Day Address. This assembly of nations would function in Washington and
maintain communications throughout the world until satisfactory conclusions
were reached.
The main objective of the plan was to convey the message to Germany,
Italy, and Japan that America could not passively watch them continue to pre-
pare for world conquest. Another expected benefit would be that nations
might be encouraged to resist the three "bandit nations" by an unequivocal
indication that the United States would cooperate in an effort to resolve the
growing crises. On the tactical side, Welles thought that his proposal might
be acceptable to the American public because it avoided international confer-
ences, which had been noted for their lack of accomplishments.
The "peace plan" was well received by President Roosevelt. "He was not
only receptive, but particularly enthusiastic." Some insight to Roosevelt's
enthusiasm has been provided by Cordell Hull in his memoirs:
Almost before I knew it, I found the President completely
embracing this project. The colorful drama to be staged in
the White House appealed to him. For several years he had
pondered the idea of inviting the heads of the nations of
Europe to hold a meeting with him at sea. Around a table






It is perhaps this same philosophy that Roosevelt took to later
conferences such as the Yalta Conference.
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The cooperative and dramatic spirit of the "Quarantine Speech" can be
seen in the "peace plan." Whether or not the President had conceived of
similar action when he spoke of a "concerted effort" remains a debatable
point.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was definitely not in favor of the plan.
Arguing forcefully, he persuaded the President that it should not be attempted:
At this late stage in 1937, Germany, Japan, and Italy had
pushed their rearmament so far that there could be no doubt
it was intended for offense, not defense, for conquest, not
for peace. It would be fatal to lull the democracies into a
feeling of tranquility through a peace congress, at the very
moment when their utmost efforts should actually be directed
toward arming themselves for self-defense. 19
Almost as if there were coordination with the White House, the very next
day after the "Quarantine Speech" appeared in the newspapers, a lengthy arti-
cle strongly advocating international action came out in the New York Times .
The article, authored by one of America's most devoted and respected states-
men—Henry L. Stimson, was the most articulate, stinging, and accurate indict-
ment of the United States policy of appeasing Japan by the omission of positive
action that could thwart Japanese aggression in China:
The problem of the preservation of China's peaceful civiliza-
tion cannot be solved by the armed intervention of the Occident.
But that is very far from saying that the only alternative
is inaction or a passive or shameful acquiescence in the wrong
that is now being done. The lamentable fact is that today the
aggression of Japan is being actively assisted by the efforts
of men of our own nation and men of the other great democracy
in the world— the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not
only being actively assisted, but our assistance is so effective
and predominant that without it even today the agression would
in all probability be promptly checked and cease....
I have heard Theodore Roosevelt say that he put peace above
everything except righteousness. Where the two came into con-
flict he supported righteousness. In our recent efforts to
avoid war we have reversed this principle and are trying to put
peace above righteousness. We have thereby gone far toward
19
Ibid. , I, 547.
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killing the influence of our country in the progress of the
world. At the same time, instead of protecting, we have
endangered our own peace....
Such a policy of amoral drift... will only set back the
hands of progress. It will not save us from entanglement.
It will even make entanglement more certain. History has
already shown us this last fact. 20
Chiang Kai-shek also recognized the consequences of appeasement policies
and stated that "if signatories to the treaties concerned continue to let
justice and law be overrun by Japan keeping up her ruthless invasion of China
21it will be tantamount to supporting Japan's plan of conquering China."
The League of Nations, searching for a way to save face and maintain the
appearance of an international organization with some potency, adopted a
proposal initiated by Lord Cranborne— the British delegate to the League.
Basically the plan was to pass the responsibility for action to the signatories
of the Nine Power Washington Treaty of 1922. Everyone realized that any ef-
fective action would depend upon the United States taking a more active role,
and the proposal was a thinly veiled scheme to compel involvement of Washing-
ton. The Assembly of the League of Nations adopted, by resolution, the two
reports prepared by the Subcommittee and forwarded by the Advisory Committee.
These reports effectively labelled Japan as a breaker of treaties and a war-
maker, and called for a conference of the Nine Power signatories. The Resolu-
tion also stated that the Assembly "...expresses its moral support for China,
and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any
action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance
20,Complete text of Stimson's letter to the editor is printed in NYT,
October 7, 1937, 12.
If Japan desired to fight a nation that resorted to economic measures
to obstruct aggression Stimson was prepared to face the consequences; however,
he believed that Japan was not ready to go that far in 1937. Stimson and
Bundy, 312.
21
FR 1937, III, 589.
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and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should
,22
also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China...."
Thus, while the Leage did not come out strongly for aid to China, it
offered some hackhanded help by exhorting the Members to refrain from taking
action which would hinder China's resistance.
The results of the League's work were published on October 6, 1937, and
on that same day the State Department issued a release that endorsed the
League's action. The United States was in "general accord" with the conclu-
sions of the League; and, in the endorsing statement, publicly admitted for
the first time that Japan's action in China "is inconsistent with the princi-
ples which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to
23
the provisions" of the Nine Power and Kellogg-Briand Pacts.
At this point the chances looked very good that some sort of international
pressure might be put upon Japan to cease her aggressive actions in China.
The President had taken a strong stand in his Quarantine Speech and the United
24
States had concurred with the League of Nations. The stage was now set for
the conference that could possibly have given collective security and inter-
national morality new meanings. Instead, decisions for collective appeasement
were made that would ultimately lead to a conference that acquiesced in
Japan's aggression through a failure to adopt any plan of forthright action.
22
For complete texts of the Reports and the Resolution, see DIA 1937,
686-701.
23
FR 1937, IV, 62.
24
Ambassador Grew was very disappointed with the latest United States
pronouncements. He thought that the "Quarantine Speech" and the endorsement
of the League of Nations Resolution were contrary to the "carefully considered
recommendations" sent to Washington by his embassy. "Our primary and funda-
mental concept," Grew wrote, "was to avoid involvement in the Far Eastern mess;
we have chosen the road which might lead directly to involvement." Grew, II,
1166-68.
For a good summary and statements of Grew's recommendations, which amount
to a policy of appeasement toward Japan, see FR 1937, III, 591-93.
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The same day that the League of Nations passed its Resolution, the
British seized the initiative and began to plan for a Nine Power conference.
25
They suggested to the United States that Washington act as the host. Out-
right rejection of the British suggestion was followed by several diplomatic
exchanges that resulted in the acceptance of a Washington proposal that
Belgium should sponsor the conference in Brussels. The Belgians were not
enthusiastic about holding the conference in their country. In fact, the
Belgian Ambassador in Japan strongly recommended against a meeting in Brussels.
He thought that Belgium's interests in Japan would be injured as nothing would
alter the developments in China except force, which would not be forthcoming.
The wording of the invitations to the conference also presented a dip-
lomatic challenge to the international community. None of the powers were
willing to assume the responsibility for any onus that might arise from con-
ference action; hence, the invitations were issued by the Belgium Government
at the request of the British Government and with the approval of the American
Government
.
During this period, both international and national observers were trying
to determine what position the United States would take at the conference.
The main question, which had remained unanswered, was the significance of the
"Quarantine Speech." Norman Davis, who had apparently been in contact with
Roosevelt, told several ranking members of the State Department on October 7
that the President was not going to make any further move in foreign affairs
27
until "he hears from the country."
25






Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers : Selections from the Diplo-
matic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat edited by Nancy H. Hooker (Cambridge
Harvard Univ. Press, 1956), 155.
Moffat stated that he and Davis differed considerably upon what they
hoped the President would hear from the country.
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The country was not quiet, but the sentiment was so divided and diverse
that anyone with a closed mind could interpret public opinion to be just as
he preconceived it. A very influential barometer was »the results of a poll of
Congressmen conducted by the Philadelphia Inquirer . By a margin of 2^ to 1
the Congressmen contacted were against cooperating with the League of Nations
"either in sanctions or active intervention" in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
At the other extreme were letters to the editors of newspapers similar to the
one that stated: "If aggressor nations can be assured that no united force will
be applied against them, then it is a farewell to peace. Italy started a pre-
cedent, Japan followed through. Germany and Italy now wait on the sidelines.
Their future course depends upon what we, united with other nations, do today.
A strong unflinching stand will force their future activities into peaceful
channels.... We either face a risk today or a disastrous certainty tomor-
,.29
row.
Roosevelt was undoubtedly sensitive to criticism. Evidently he expected
more of a negative reaction to his speech than actually appeared. In a letter
to Colonel Edward M. House, Roosevelt stated: "I thought, frankly that there
would be more criticism and I verily believe that as time goes on we can
slowly but surely make people realize that war will be a greater danger to us
if we close all the doors and windows than if we go out in the street and use
30
our influence to curb the riot."
To quiet some of the fears expressed domestically by the isolationists,
President Roosevelt made a radio address to the nation on October 12. With
28
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specific reference to the coming Brussels Conference, he said: "The purpose
of this conference will be to seek by agreement a solution of the present
situation in China. In efforts to find that solution it is our purpose to
cooperate with the other signatories to this Treaty, including China and
Japan. . .America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America
31
actively engages in the search for peace."
The search for peace had to be conducted quickly as the conference was
32
scheduled to convene on October 30. On the same day that the invitations
were extended (October 16) , the United States appointed Norman Davis as its
sole delegate to the conference. Stanley Hornbeck and Jay Pierrepont Moffat,
Chief of the State Department's Division of European Affairs, were assigned as
advisers to Davis. The delegate and his advisers had only four days to confer
in person with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt before they had to sail
for Europe.
Secretary Hull's written instructions to Davis indicated that the princi-
ples set forth in the July 16 and August 23 statements should be used as a
general guide for participation in the conference. Less emphasis was placed
on the President's pronouncements of October 5 and October 12. Included in
Hull's guidelines was a directive which effectively constrained the diplomatic
options available to Davis: "You will bear in mind also that public opinion
in the United States has expressed its most emphatic determination that the
33
United States keep out of war."
31
Text printed in FRJ 1931-1941, I, 400-401.
32
The date was later changed to November 3. The United States had pro-
posed an earlier date (preferably no later than October 22), probably to take
advantage of the initially favorable public reaction to the "Quarantine
Speech" and to avoid conflicting interest with the special session of Congress
called for the middle of November. See FR 1937, IV, 68.
33
FR 1937, IV, 84.
Hull has written in his memoirs that Roosevelt's strategy for the
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The President's instructions to Davis also emphasized the importance of
public opinion, especially with regard to Anglo-American relations. Roosevelt
impressed upon Davis that there were three things to be kept in mind and made
34
clear at every step of the conference. First, the United States will not
participate in any joint action with the League of Nations. The second was
that present policy did not forsee the United States being pushed out in front
as the leader in, or suggestor of, future action. Finally, it was important
that America should not appear to resemble a "tail to the British kite."
The instructions given to Davis emphasized the reluctance of the Admin-
istration to commit itself to an active role in foreign affairs. A strong
isolationist sentiment coupled with a domestic crisis and declining popularity
were powerful forces compelling Roosevelt to back away from international
cooperation, which can be a controversial subject even in normal times. A
radical move in foreign policy was almost guaranteed to weaken Roosevelt's
political power base. Unity was needed to continue with domestic legislative
programs and reforms.
On the personal side, the President could not help being hesitant, if not
apprehensive, about implementing a controversial policy after the defeat and
criticism he suffered over the "court packing" attempt. Sumner Welles sum-
marized the President's dilemma:
Conference was to call repeatedly upon the Japanese to come to Brussels to
negotiate with China. Roosevelt wanted to prolong the Conference and use it
as a vehicle to educate public opinion and to bring all possible moral pres-
sure to bear on Japan. Hull, I, 522.
34
FR 1937, IV, 85.
The importance of educating the public to the very real danger of
policies that would result in war was emphasized in a conversation between
Roosevelt and British historian H.G. Wells on October 21. The discussion
included a forecast of when World War II would begin. Wells predicted 1940,
and Roosevelt thought that it would commence in 1941. Both agreed that there




...The contest over his attempt to reform the Supreme Court
had later provoked a schism within the Democratic Party as
deep as it was bitter. The struggle that ensued undeniably
alienated from Franklin Roosevelt some of the immense mass
support that had been so clearly shown the preceding Novem-
ber.
Under the circumstances, the President was unwilling
throughout that critical spring and summer of 1937 to make
any new move that might provoke further public contro-
versy. . . .35
By October, Roosevelt was again under fire for a "court" related problem.
A violent storm of criticism had broken out over the nomination of former Klu
Klux Klan member, Hugo Black, to the Supreme Court. Although Black was
finally exonerated and his nomination approved, the result for the Administra-
tion was the loss of some political consensus.
However, the greatest obstacle preventing new ventures in international
cooperation was the President's preoccupation with the domestic recession.
One of the stock market indices showed a drop of about 30 points from August
to October to a level below the 1931 average index. And on October 18, the
market suffered its worst decline since September 24, 1931. The recession
began to look as if it was the prelude to a full-scale depression. Secretary
of the Interior Ickes had the impression that the President was disturbed by
the worsening business and economic situation to the point of being confused
37
about what, if any, action to take. Likewise, Secretary of the Treasury





A public opinion survey showed that 36.2% of the people thought Black's
appointment was a bad choice, 12.8% rated it as fair, and 22% thought it was a
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Congress was called for a special session in raid-November, and, by that
time, it was impossible to publicly ignore the economic decline. "Since your
adjournment in August," the President told Congress, "there has been a marked
recession in industrial production and industrial purchases following a fairly
39
steady advance for more than four years." Of particular interest in the
message to Congress was the complete absence of any mention of foreign affairs,
even though the Brussels Conference was by then in progress.
Roosevelt's failure to follow up the "Quarantine Speech" with some posi-
tive action in the fall of 1937 has been explained by Sumner Welles:
From the purely political standpoint, moreover, any move by
President Roosevelt to give American foreign policy even a
suggestion of the international outlook it has today [1950]
would have then been political suicide. It would not only have
been virulently assailed by his partisan opponents, but it
would have been equally obnoxious to the leaders of the Demo-
cratic Party upon whom the President was compelled to rely for
the enactment of his legislative program.
Thus, domestic considerations were absorbing the majority of the Presi-
dent's interest. International events continued to be forced by the "bandit
nations" with the democracies placed in a position of having to react to
totalitarian initiatives.
On October 19 President Roosevelt released a press statement announcing
the departure of Norman Davis for the conference in Brussels. Roosevelt took
this opportunity to reiterate the message of his October 12 "fireside-chat:"
"The purpose of this Conference will be to seek by agreement a solution of the
present situation in China." Thus, the "positive measures to preserve peace"
39
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call sounded in Chicago faded into "seek by agreement a solution" as Brussels
approached. Apparently the President's ear was attuned to the isolationist
frequencies
.
Roosevelt was convinced that the way to achieve a successful conference
was for a cooperative approach to leadership in which there would be "no one
nation going out to take the lead—no one nation, therefore, in a position to
42have a finger of fear or scorn pointed at it." ' He also clearly recognized
that any effective action would depend upon whether the United States, England,
France, and Russia could cooperate. If so, he thought, "the Japanese could be
halted and the dictators of Europe finally brought to more peaceful posi-
,,43
tions.
The French attitude toward the coming conference was distinctly indicated
when Premier Camille Chautemps told American Ambassador William C. Bullitt
that any action depended entirely on the United States. France was heavily
preoccupied with grave problems in Europe and therefore vulnerable in French
Indo-China. In case of a European war, France would prefer to have a friendly
Japan in the Far East, unless the United States would be willing to guarantee
France's Far Eastern positions. Chautemps said that "the United States alone
of all the great powers was in a position to apply both its moral influence
and force in the Far East. Whether the Nine Power Conference did anything or
not would depend entirely on what action the United States was prepared to take
,44
in the Pacific. The Vice President of the French Council of Ministers,
Leon Blum, later told Bullitt "that if England, France, the Soviet Union, and
42
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the United States should take a strong line unitedly there would be no danger
of Japan attacking any one of them." ' Blum was very pessimistic that no
accomplishments would arise from the Brussels Conference unless the United
States was prepared to guarantee with force, if necessary, both French Indo-
China and the Dutch East Indies.
The British took a more constructive attitude toward the conference.
They presented to Washington three courses of action with an analysis of some
46
of the inherent problems associated with each procedure. London recognized
that the first objective of the Brussels Conference was to attain peace by
agreement. Realizing that the chance of reaching a negotiated settlement was
slight, Britain proposed that the conference take one of three approaches:
defer any action while hoping for a change in Japan's attitude; do not take or
promise any positive action, but morally condemn Japan; or, take positive
action such as actively assisting China or putting economic pressure on Japan.
The British Government was opposed to the first two choices as they were
"tantamount to acquiescence in aggression" (appeasement by omission) . Both
options were believed to be a definite encouragement to the "peace breakers."
Britain tended toward taking some positive action as indicated in the third
alternative, even though pressure involving blockades or sanctions could lead
to retaliation by Japan. Therefore, to be effective, any action would have to
be committed by united nations which were willing to guarantee either military
support or territorial integrity of third parties, or both, in the case of
violent retaliation.
Assistant Secretary of State Hugh R. Wilson delivered Washington's reply
and stated that considerations envisaging positive action "did not arise in a
Z>5
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conference which had for its objective the finding of a solution. . .by agree-
ment." He also said that the United States was considering a procedure
along the lines of an armistice followed by peaceful negotiation to find "a
48
means of stabilizing conditions in the Far East."
In effect, the United States appeared willing to trade some Chinese
political and territorial integrity for a peace that would lessen the danger
of escalated involvement.
Russia voiced her pre-conference position with a constrained optimism.
Optimism for a successful conference was based on the hope that the "Quarantine
Speech" signified that the United States intended to take positive action with
regard to the Far East conflict. The Russians consistently adopted a hard
line and pledged their support, including the use of force if necessary, in
cooperation with France, Britain, and the United States. The Soviet Govern-
ment "is of the opinion that the Japanese should be made to realize that their
present policy will not be tolerated and that strong action will be taken if
they prove recalcitrant to the decisions of the Conference. The Soviet Union
49decries any attempt to save Japanese face." In assessing the attitude of
the Soviet Government, Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, reported a statement made earlier by the Soviet Ambassador to the
United Kingdom: "...it was better to be isolated and to be right than to be
associated and be ethically wrong as well as to be intellectually misled as to
r rr • .-50the means of effecting peace.
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After World War II, Sumner Welles wrote: "We may not now like to




At the opposite end of the scale from Russia was the Netherlands.
Although pessimistic about the chance of success, the Netherlands said that
she could be expected to support such measures as were adopted by the powers
if they did not involve her too deeply. The American Ambassador at the Hague
reported that the Netherlands intended to be as inconspicuous as possible and
to do nothing that would "tend to irritate Japan unduly."
As expected by the conference participants, Japan rejected the invitation
to attend the deliberations in Brussels. This refusal was based on several
premises. Rationalizing her action as self-defense, Japan reasoned that the
conflict did not fall under the purview of the Nine Power Treaty. Another
objection was that the conference was identified with the League of Nations,
which had cast reflections on Japan's honor by supporting China's position in
the controversy. Finally, Japan thought that a gathering of so many powers at
the conference would only serve to complicate the situation. The Japanese
note concluded by suggesting that the conflict could be resolved if the
52
Chinese Government adopted a policy of cooperation with Japan.
When President Roosevelt was notified that Japan had declined to attend,
he decided that the conference should meet as scheduled, Japan's objections
should be clarified, and a second invitation should then be extended to
Japan.
Hull communicated the President's desires to Norman Davis, who was then
in Europe, for implementation.
51
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Further activity in Washington resulted in a draft resolution being sent
to Davis, prior to the conference, for use in case Japan refused the second
• •- -•
54invitation.
The instructions that accompanied the draft resolution indicated that the
resolution should be presented to the conference by one of the smaller powers.
In effect, this draft anticipated the failure of the conference to find an
effective means to solve the "Undeclared War" and proposed that Germany, Great
Britain, and the United States make themselves available to help China and
Japan reach a solution based on moralistic principles. The intention was that
the conference should then adjourn or recess for a period not to exceed one
month.
Thus while Washington was trying to avoid any publicity as a "conference
leader," she paradoxically was trying to direct the action of the conferees.
Norman Davis' reply to the State Department indicated that he thought that if
it was the "function to accomplish something constructive, we should not
suggest or direct attention to a possible method of bringing the Conference to
an end until there had been a concerted effort to make the influence of the
Conference felt and to take any steps possible toward that objective."
The defeatist attitude of the State Department was to persist throughout
the conference, and it became an additional handicap to the American delegation,
Meanwhile Ambassador Grew telegraphed to Washington that there was very
little prospect that any form of collective mediation or offer of good offices
would be acceptable to Japan. He said that an offer to mediate or to extend
good offices coming from a single power (i.e., Great Britain or the United
54
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States) might be acceptable at the appropriate moment. In effect, Grew was
saying that once Japan had achieved her objectives she would probably listen
to any proposal that acquiesced in the accomplished objective. Grew advised
that if there were ever to be any possibility of successful mediation the
"Conference should adhere strictly to its mandate of attempting to promote
peace by agreement and avoid any further expression of opinion on origins of
conflict or responsibilities involved."
Anglo-American cooperation continued to be the real hub about which the
success or failure of the conference would rotate. Anthony Eden stated the
official British attitude in a speech delivered in the House of Commons on
November 1. He said, in part, that "We all know that any action. .. that can be
taken in this Far Eastern dispute does essentially depend upon the co-opera-
tion of the United States, and I say without hesitation. .. that in order to get
the full co-operation on an equal basis of the United States Government in an
international conference, I would travel, not only from Geneva to Brussels,
but from Melbourne to Alaska, more particularly in the present state of the
international situation."
American responsibility for the outcome of the conference was clearly
recognized and bluntly stated by Edwin L. James: "And the immediate truth is
that action and fairly quick action is all that will influence the Japanese in
CO





At the end of his speech, Eden referred to Mr. Herbert Morrison: "He
used certain words to this effect: 'Would we in this dangerous and difficult
Far Eastern situation go as far as the United States, in full accord with them,
not rushing in front but not being left behind,' I wholly accept that defi-
nition as our guide." Eden, 607; or, DIA 1937, 60-69.
CO
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conference was largely sponsored by the United States, James stated, "and so
it is that the success or failure of the Brussels Conference will be largely
59
an American success or failure."
The day before the conference opened the British and United States dele-
gations met for substantial talks. The British advocated the use of positive
action as a last resort. On the other hand, the United States avoided the
topic of forceful procedures and emphasized the importance of educating public
opinion. Eden summarized the British position by saying that "they would
neither attempt to take a lead nor to push America out in front; that if con-
structive efforts failed he would be willing to join fully in direct pressure
on Japan...." Davis outlined the American position by saying that "we are
going to make a genuine effort at the conference to produce some constructive
result; that in the process public opinion would be crystallized. . .and that if
our attempts at a constructive solution by agreement failed we would have to
be guided thereafter by developments and by public opinion in the United
States."
After the meeting of the delegations, Eden and Davis continued with a
private conversation, which has been recorded in Eden's memoirs. According
to the memoirs, Davis related that President Roosevelt was deeply concerned
Ibid .
60




During the course of the talks, Davis said that the United States would
have to bear the brunt of any Japanese retaliation. Eden denied this, and
said that Britain could and would send some ships to the Far East.
For more on the Eden-Davis talks, especially with regard to sanctions,
see FR 1937, IV, 152-55.
The breakdown of Anglo-American military forces in Chinese waters
indicated that Britain, suprisingly enough, had relatively more strength than
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about the world situation and was anxious to cooperate in an attempt to stop
the deteriorating international relationships. Davis also said that the Presi-
dent had told him that the Conference would either succeed, or, having failed,
would present the world with a futile situation in which further action by the
United States could not be ruled out. The President's view was that all
liberty depended upon the course of the conference and the state of public
opinion in America at the end of it. Roosevelt was afraid that Great Britain
would be compelled to withdraw from the Far East because of tensions in Europe
and that the United States then would have to face, perhaps alone, a greatly
strengthened Japan. Therefore, Davis stated, Roosevelt wished that something
could be done to check the tendency now.
The Brussels Conference opened on November 3 with a round of addresses
£ q
that were more notable for their rhetoric than their content. The Italian
Delegate, Count Aldrovanandi-Marescotti, who was expected to champion Japan's
cause, spoke about some of the facts of power politics which he indicated were
the United States; of course Britain could not increase her strength very
rapidly
:
Combatant U.S. Asiatic Fleet Britain's China Squadron
Aircraft Carriers 1
Cruisers 1 6 (various sizes)
Destroyers 13 9
Gunboats, etc. 12 18
Escorts/Minesweepers 3 5
Submarines 6 17
Britain also had four battalions of troops available—roughly equivalent the
number of U.S. troops, see Note 57 to Chapter II. For comparison, Japan had
approximately 250,000 men in the field in China; and her navy consisted of 10
battleships or heavy cruisers, 5 aircraft carriers, 34 various sized cruisers,
103 destroyers, and 57 submarines. China, on the other hand, had no navy to
speak of, but she did put about 500,000 poorly-equipped troops into the battle
against Japan in North China. Statistics from NYT, August 15, 1937, 30; and,
E.G. Hubbard, "The Far East," in the Survey of International Affairs
,
1937
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938).
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naively not publicly recognized by the majority. He stated that since Japan
was not represented at the Conference, "full and frank communication" in
accordance with Article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty would have meaning only for
the conferees and in itself would not end the conflict. As he saw it, the
practical role for the Conference was to lead the parties (Japan and China)
towards a peace by bringing them together in direct negotiations. He concluded
that his government "must reserve its opinion as to the [Conference] results
which, however amicable the means employed, can lead to little more than pla-
tonic resolutions, and a further revelation of impotence unless it takes into
64
account the realities .. .mentioned. " The Soviet Delegate, Litvinov, took a
hard line position that was definitely anti-Japanese. He also warned the Con-
ference that it was quite easy for an international organization, when con-
fronted by a successful aggressor, to gain a momentary success by saying to
the aggressor: "Take your plunder, take what you have seized by force, and
peace be with you, and to say to the victim of aggression: love your aggres-
sor; resist not evil." Litvinov warned that that might constitute a super-
ficial success for the Conference, but that such a success would "only provoke
,.66
new cases of aggression.
The remainder of the first week of the Conference was spent mainly on
procedural matters, a proposal to set up a small sub-committee to deal directly
with China and Japan, and in drafting a reply to Japan's refusal to attend the
Conference which included a second invitation. On November 6 Davis telegraphed
to Hull that he had encountered a far greater degree of defeatism in the dele-












• • • j. 67the continental powers was to appoint a negotiating committee and adjourn.
There is no evidence that Hull ever responded to this report.
A note was drafted asking the Japanese whether they would be willing to
meet with a small sub-committee of the Conference. As soon as the text was
approved, several delegates wanted to adjourn until the Japanese reply was
received. Davis countered this desire with the argument that an unfavorable
impression would be created if the Conference appeared to be dependent upon a
favorable reply from Japan. As was becoming customary, deference was shown to
the head of the American delegation, and adjournment was postponed.
In the meantime, the question of sanctions had again risen in talks be-
tween Davis and Eden. This alternative was considered as a possible course
of action if the present policy towards Japan failed. Davis stated that the
United States would not impose any official sanctions, but would instead just
refuse to buy Japanese goods. Eden's reply indicated that this method formed
the most serious sanction against Italy and that it was most noted for its
lack of success. Eden explained that there were two kinds of sanctions:
effective and ineffective. The former ran the risk of war and to ignore this
fact was dangerous. Britain was willing, Eden continued, to discuss these
sanctions with the United States, but any considerations must be conducted
realistically with a willingness to share the risks, whatever they may be,
through to the end. Evidently Eden and Chamberlain were not of a similar mind
67
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Moffat had recorded in his diary on November 1, that he had "never
known a conference where even before we meet people are discussing ways
to end it." Moffat, 161.
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on the question of sanctions as the Prime Minister stated that he would on no
account impose any sanction.
The editor of the French newspaper Echo de Paris summarized the first few
days of the Conference by saying that "a good deal of harm has been done. Not
only have the empty proceedings in Brussels aroused Japanese public opinion,
but by making themselves contemptible once more, the British, United States,
and French Governments have played into the hands of Joachim von Ribbentrop,
the German promoter of the extension to Italy of the German-Japanese pact,
supposedly directed against communism." The editor was referring to the
addition of Italy on November 6 to the Anti-Comintern Pact previously signed
by Germany and Japan. There is no doubt that the German Foreign Office was
closely watching the proceedings in Brussels. They could not help being
impressed by the apparent lack of Anglo-American solidarity.
The night of November 10 the Secretary of State received two important
documents from Europe. The first came from Davis and expressed doubt that the
Conference could be prolonged indefinitely, as Washington had wished. Davis
proposed three possible courses of action based on an anticipated rejection by
Japan of the second invitation. The first alternative was for the Conference
participants to admit failure and adjourn to consult with their respective
governments. The most forceful proposal was for the conferees to agree upon
some form of united pressure against Japan in the fields of trade or shipping.
The third option, which was a compromise between the other two, was to agree
upon a resolution that would advocate favorable treatment towards China, no
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involved with a third party before she settled by agreement with China. Davis
also strongly urged that the Neutrality Act be repealed or suspended insofar
as it concerned the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
The second document was a logical and realistic analysis of the inter-
national situation by French Prime Minister Camille Chautemps as told to
Ambassador Bullitt. In part of his analysis Chautemps said: "What I cannot
understand is that you Americans from time to time talk as if you really in-
tended to act in the international sphere when you have no intention of acting
in any way that can be effective. I understand how much the President may
desire to do something today to preserve peace; but I should infinitely rather
have him say nothing than make speeches, like his speech in Chicago, which
arouse immense hopes when there is no possibility that in the state of Ameri-
can opinion and the state of mind of the Senate he can follow up such speeches
by action. Such a policy on the part of the United States merely leads the
dictatorships to believe that the democracies are full of words but are unwill-
ing to back u\- their words by force, and force is the thing that counts in the
world." 72
Neither document evoked any new changes in American policy. Davis re-
ceived a wandering reply from the Secretary of State that tacitly agreed that
the way to proceed was to agree upon a resolution that advocated favorable
treatment towards China, no recognition of Japan's conquests, and no military
aid for Japan if she became involved with a third party before she settled by
agreement with China. However, Hull stated that none of the measures should
be proposed by the United States, as it was not in a position to enter into
any agreements for implementing them.
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Japan rejected the second invitation to the Conference on November 12
saying that she was acting in self-defense in China, and therefore the conflict
did not come under the scope of the Nine Power Treaty. This final refusal
extinguished any remaining hope of achieving practical results at the Brussels
Conference. When the delegates reassembled on November 13, the Chinese repre-
sentative made a last attempt to solicit a commitment from the conferees to
exercise pressure against Japan. The American, British, and French delegates
in turn spoke about the importance of respecting the sanctity of treaties and
the rule of international law. However means of enforcing treaty sanctity and
international law were not mentioned. The Conference session was then reces-
sed to allow the delegations an opportunity to study the text of a proposed
declaration. This draft was jointly submitted by the United States, Britain,
and France. The expressed purpose of this declaration was to put the Confer-
ence on record as refusing to accept Japan's arguments as valid.
During this recess, a response was received to the recommendations for-
warded previously by Davis to the State Department. Norman Davis felt very
disappointed over the answer. In effect, Secretary Hull had cautioned him to
initiate nothing more than platitudes. In view of the uncompromising Japanese
reply to the second invitation, Davis decided to try to persuade the State
Department to permit a resolution stating an expanded version of Stimson's
non-recognition doctrine, which would include advocating a prohibition of
73
loans and credits to the Japanese Government. Two telegrams were sent by
Davis to Hull on November 14 asking for participation in some "positive
steps." One of Davis' telegrams alluded to a policy of appeasement by
omission of action: "What concerns me somewhat is that while Japan is now
73
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nervous for fear that we may agree upon something positive, if we go on much
longer without any evidence of intention to do anything more than preach she
will soon become firmly convinced that she can pursue her course without any
danger of interference."
The Department's reply arrived the next day and indicated that (1) the
action requested was outside the scope of the Conference, and (2) a re-affir-
mation of the non-recognition doctrine was probably premature but could be
7 f>
presented if it were not phrased in explicit terms.
The Conference adopted its first declaration on November 15. Italy voted
against the declaration, and Norway, Sweden, and Denmark abstained from voting
on it. The heart of the declaration stated that the conferees "must consider
what is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party to an inter-
national treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that the
action which it has taken does not come within the scope of the treaty and
sets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold to be opera-
tive in the circumstances." The key words in the declaration are "common
attitude." While this statement did not propose any specific plan of action,
it did at least leave the door open for some form of cooperative action towards
collective security.
Shortly after adopting its first declaration the Conference adjourned for
a week. Ostensibly the recess was to give the delegates an opportunity to
consult their governments about further proceedings for the Conference. Eden
and Delbos left Brussels, and their departure seemed to signify that nothing










Davis made one more attempt at persuading Washington to accept a final
resolution which would reaffirm a non-recognition policy and be reinforced by
78
a policy of withholding loans and credits from the Japanese Government.
Hull's reply stated that the temper of the country was not disposed to favor
pressure or threats toward Japan and that the sooner Davis left Brussels the
less likely would be the probability that Washington could be accused of
79fostering such policies. Moffat recorded in his diary that he personally
was pleased with the State Department's replies, but that Davis, in view of
the personal instructions he had received from Roosevelt prior to his depar-
ture, would have a hard time retreating as far as the State Department
A A 80desired.
The Conference ended much in the same way it had begun. After the British
and American delegates concurred in the wording of the final report, they per-
suaded the Belgian host to "circularize the text saying it had been prepared
Q1
at his request by the British and American delegations...." The acceptance
of the final report on November 24 went very smoothly. In the words of Jay
Pierrepont Moffat: "The delegates were anxious to complete the funeral
on
arrangements, bury the Conference, and depart."
The final report borrowed heavily from the Washington draft and is notable
not for what it said, but for what it left unsaid. Appeasement by omission of
"70
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Hull's reply also included a memorandum to be used in drafting a final
report for the Conference. Davis was cautioned not to assume a position of









action was carried to the point that the "final report" did not even exhort
the Powers to "refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of
weakening China's power of resistance," as the Resolution by the League of
Nations had stated on October 6.
Under the camouflage of a temporary adjournment the Conference was, in
fact, permanently closed.
The significance of this abortive period of diplomacy has been aptly
summarized by Herbert Feis : "The failure of the Brussels Conference could not
be made up. The last good chance to work out a stable settlement between
Q O
China and Japan was lost in 1937."
The alternative to firm collective action for peace and stability was
eventually war.
o o





In the realm of international affairs the American public is enigmatic.
A desire to influence or mold the morality of the world often has come into
direct contradiction with an equally strong desire to avoid areas of open con-
frontation. Geographic isolation facilitated the growth of a tradition of
viewing international problems with an objective detachment, which by its very
nature assumed a superiority of insight.
During the 1930' s, egocentrism was so ingrained in United States politi-
cal thought and behavior that any connotation of "foreign" presumed an "un-
American" significance (no pun intended). Indicative of the interest in world
events during the critical year of 1937 is the fact that the "Sino-Japanese
Undeclared War" was the only international item among the ten "most inter-
esting" news stories selected by the public. Failing to make the "top ten"
were such newsworthy events as the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Purge Trails,
the Nyon Conference (Submarine Piracy in the Mediterranean Sea)
,
and the
Brussels Conference. With their thoughts turned inward, the populace rested,
albeit uneasily, behind the isolationist wall of neutrality legislation.
The commencement of hostilities in the Undeclared War certainly did not
evoke a mandate from the people for the Government to become "involved."
Roosevelt could honestly declare, as he did in his "Quarantine Speech" and his
October 12 "fireside-chat" that "America hates war." But hating war is not
enough. Everyone hates war. The rational answer, which can be given just as
easily by irrational governments and statesmen, to any question concerning the
Taken from Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street : The Impact of





validity of war in the abstract is that war is bad, evil, or a number of other
similar invectives. The essence of the problem is to determine the difference
between the "abstract" and the harsh "reality," and then establish national
objectives that take into account the historic proclivity of nation-states to
resort to force-of-arms in international conduct.
If history has taught mankind anything of value, then certainly one of
the most important lessons learned is that "peace-at-any-price" is an invalid
concept. Even the most ardent pacifist is willing to lay down his life or
violently fight for the goal of pacifism if he is subjectively committed. The
suggestion here is that once war leaves the academic realm in which it is
cloistered in the abstract, and enters the real world, it obtains an emotional
price that can eventually be less than the cost of peace.
Assuming that war, or the threat of war, is a very real possibility, or
even inevitability, in the affairs of the nation-states, the question then
becomes how to defend the peace or escape the consequences of war with the
least cost. Many arguments have been presented against the validity of a sys-
tem of collective security. The breakdown or failure of this school of nation-
al security thought is attributed to the fact that it has not provided a
workable answer. Three, and possibly four, major wars have been fought in the
twentieth century in the defense of the ideal of a collectively safe and
coordinate world. The fundamental reason why "collective security" has not
been more successful is that it is conceived in abstraction and implemented in
pragmatism. In a pure sense, the theory of collective security, whereby an
association of nations collectively guarantees the security of each individual
nation by sanctions or multilateral alliances against an aggressor, is unas-
sailable; however, the entrance into active hostilities is a practical decision




All too often, when war is not treated as a reality, the short-run cost
of voiding peace, or threatening voidance, is not exceeded in the furtherance
of national objectives. Unfortunately, history has demonstrated that the
long-run cost to maintain national objectives can inflate to an exorbitant
price during the period of delayed recognition of war in the verity. This was
the case of the Brussels Conference.
This study of America's diplomatic role during the early months of the
Sino-Japanese Conflict not only "sets the record straight" but also illus-
trates many important lessons at the "tactical" level. Throughout the summer
and fall of 1937, American diplomatic efforts were directed towards attaining
the greatest political objective—world peace—by force of world opinion.
However, during those days it was illusory thinking to expect that world
opinion could be a viable force when there was no commonly accepted standard
of world conscience. Moral suasion can only become a potent force when it is
valued more dearly than the manifestation of power. Post World War II inter-
national polity has seen an increased usefulness of moral suasion, but in 1937
it was either ignored or treated as a political liability by the totalitarian
powers. The profuse appeals for peace were probably interpreted as a sign of
weakness and thus they produced the opposite effect than was intended for
them.
The evidence clearly points to the fact that Roosevelt was fully aware
that Germany, Italy, and Japan (the "three bandit nations") presented a real
2
danger to world peace. He also recognized that ultimately the United States
would have to be aligned with Great Britain and the democracies against the
totalitarian powers. The problem he faced was to find courses of action which





between isolationists and internationalists. That the country eventually
emerged victorious over both the domestic crises and the Axis Powers is a
tribute to Roosevelt's political skill. But, "ultimate victory" does not
invalidate critical examinations of events that made up the means to the end.
The decision-makers of 1937 cannot be fairly faulted in their theoretical
judgments with the added analytical knowledge provided by hindsight. However,
what is important to note is that the opinion of the adversary is formed by
practical and not theoretical judgments. The effectiveness of a foreign
policy or diplomatic maneuver depends to a great extent upon the interpre-
tation of the policy or maneuver by the opponent. When Roosevelt placed
restrictions on government-owned shipping in September, the Japanese chose to
interpret the move as being sympathetic to their cause; therefore, for all
practical purposes, it became a diplomatic liability for the United States in
her attempt to curb Japanese aggression.
The Japanese could not help being encouraged by the lack of effective
opposition from the United States in 1937. When American diplomatic maneuvers
were committed publicly to no more than mere protestations and vocal per-
suasions, Japan had little to fear. A wag of that period stated that, "Japan
must be the owner of the world's finest collection of international censures,
3
reproofs, protests, chidings, demurrers and anim adversions in existence."
Unfortunately, "world frowns" did not check Japan's imperialistic ambitions.
Records exposed at the conclusion of World War II revealed the attitude of
Japanese officials in 1937:
3
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It was safe for the Foreign Office to assume that the
economic sanctions Japan feared were not forthcoming.
The aggression in China, the Foreign Office concluded,
could continue without any foreign intervention.
^
An important aspect of this study is the illustration of a definite
maturity in British foreign policy during this period which has been over-
shadowed by the ignominious settlement of the Munich Crisis. To their credit,
the British consistently did not hesitate to seize the diplomatic initiative
both in negotiations with Japan and the United States. While the argument can
be advanced that Chamberlain would not commit the London Government to action
as forceful as Eden sometimes advocated, the British were at least desirous of
some form of joint positive action, even if only a show of naval strength in
Far Eastern waters.
A limited positive action would at least have carried the implication of
an unwillingness to acquiesce in Japan's aggression, and may have had the
additional results of either forcing Japan's Government into a more peaceful
position or at least or making the issue crystal clear to indecisive people
around the world.
It should be remembered that Britain was primarily and heavily engaged in
the problems of Europe, actively involved in the Spanish Civil War Non-inter-
vention committee and the Anti-Priacy Patrol in the Mediterranean, and
passively involved in watching German moves.
On the other hand, the United States was truly the only uncommitted
nation with the resources at hand to effectively influence decisions in the
Far East. In fact, most of the twentieth century international agreements of
any consequence in the Far East pointed to the natural leadership position of
Quoted in David J. Lu, From The Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor :
Japan's Entry Into World War II (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), 21,
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the United States; the Open Door Policy, Russo-Japanese War Arbitration, the
Washington Conferences in the 1920's, Stimson's Non-Recognition Doctrine, etc.
However, in 1937 the Washington Government was possessed by an almost psychotic
fear of being accused of "pulling British chestnuts out of the fire." Ham-
pered with this fear, Government officials could only pursue courses of
"independent" and sometimes "parallel" action.
With no one to say to Japan "You may go this far and no further in the
pursuit of your objectives!," the evolution of a policy of appeasement
occurred not by design but by default. The failure of the United States to
take positive action, albeit justifiable in the context of public sentiment,
was appeasement by omission.
The need for more vigorous action, although recognized and advocated in
many instances, resulted paradoxically in virtual acquiescence in actions that
were being vociferously condemned and berated. It would be naive to assume
that this lesson was not learned well by the totalitarian powers. The degree
to which appeasing Japan in 1937 contributed to the inevitability of World War
II can only be imagined with the knowledge provided by hindsight.
An appropriate epitaph for this abortive period of diplomacy was provided
by one of the international correspondents at Brussels:
EQUITY HAS BEEN LEFT ON THE SCAFFOLD
AND AGGRESSION UNMOLESTED ON THE THRONE.
5





March 4. Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated as President of the United States.
March 27. Japan formally withdrew from membership in the League of Nations.
April 5. Secretary of State Hull advocated adoption of a discretionary arms
embargo policy in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs: "The enactment of this legislation would strengthen the position
of this Government in its international relations and would enable us to
cooperate more efficiently in efforts to maintain the peace of the world."
Peace and War, 178.
May 22. The United States at the Geneva Disarmament Conference offered tacit
support to collective security action if some agreement on disarmament
was reached.
May 27. Secretary Hull urged President Roosevelt to reconsider his
[Roosevelt's] approval of an impartial arms embargo as it was in direct
"conflict with our position at Geneva." Hull, I, 230.
May 31. Tangku Truce signed between Sino-Japanese forces.
June 12. World Economic Conference commenced in London.
June 22. The United States rejected a plan for temporary monetary stabiliza-
tion.
July 27. World Economic Conference adjourned without international cooperation
for monetary stability.
September 2. Italy and Russia signed a pact of friendship, non-aggression and
neutrality.
September 3. Chancellor Adolph Hitler renounced war except against Bolshevism.
October 14. Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.
November 2. Secretary Hull told German Ambassador Hans Luther that "a general




November 16. The United States recognized the Government of Soviet Russia.
December 28. President Roosevelt delivered a major address on foreign policy
in which he denounced armed interventions. "The maintenance of consti-
tutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving
upon the United States alone.... The blame for the danger to world peace
lies not in the world population but in the political leaders.... We are
giving cooperation to the League in every matter which is not primarily






January 22. Japan's Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, proclaimed Japan's special
responsibility for the jnaintenance of peace in East Asia.
January 26. Poland and Germany signed a ten year nonaggression pact.
February 8. Senator Nye introduced a resolution to the Senate to investigate
the munitions industry.
February 17. Britain, France, and Italy issued a declaration that the integ-
rity and independence of Austria had to be maintained.
April 4. Russia and Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania renewed their nonaggres-
sion treaties until 1945.
April 7. Finland and Russia renewed their nonaggression treaty until 1945.
April 10. Japan's Foreign Office announced that it was absolutely opposed to
any foreign interference in China.
April 12. Senate approved the investigation of the munitions industry.
April 13. Johnson Act became law. Financial transactions with nations in
default on obligations to the United States prohibited.
April 25. Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirota, stated that "Japan had no
intention. .. of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative
integrity of China...." Peace and War
,
215.
April 29. The United States reaffirmed to Japan the "rights" and "interests"
of America with regard to China. Peace and War , 216.
May 23-24. Congress approved a resolution to permit the President to embargo
arms to the belligerents in the Chaco War.
May 28. President Roosevelt embargoed arms to Paraguay and Bolivia.
June 11. In speaking about his fear of possible war, Secretary Hull stated
that "preparation for war but too often makes war inevitable." Peace and
War, 232.
June 12. The United States passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
August 2. Hitler was appointed President of the Reich upon the death of Paul
von Hindenburg. Hitler became both Chancellor and Fuehrer.
September 10. Germany rejected any association in an Eastern Locarno Pact.
September 18. Russia joined the League of Nations.
September 29. Italy and Ethiopia issued a joint statement denying any inten-
tion of aggression against each other.
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December 5. France and Russia signed a consultative pact.
December 27. Ambassador Grew warned Secretary Hull that Japan was determined




January 3. Ethiopia appealed to the League to ensure her safety.
January 13. Saar plebiscite held.
January 29. The United States rejected membership in the World Court.
March 1. The Saar returned to Germany.
German Air Force officially came into existence.
March 16. Germany instituted compulsory military service.
April 11. Stresa Conference conducted by Britain, France, and Italy to
consider German rearmament.
April 14. Stresa conferees denounced German repudiation of the Versailles
Treaty.
April 15-17. The League of Nations condemned Germany's unilateral denunciation
of the Versailles Treaty.
May 2. France and Russia signed a mutual assistance pact.
June 12. Armistice signed in the Chaco War.
June 18. Britain and Germany signed a naval treaty limiting the German fleet
to 35% of Britain's surface ships and to 45% for submarines.
June 27. France assumed freedom in naval arms.
July 25. Britain embargoed arms to Italy and Ethiopia.
August 18. Roosevelt appealed to Mussolini to avoid war.
August 31. President Roosevelt signed into law the first Neutrality Act.
September 14. Geneva General Disarmament Conference faded into permanent
adjournment.
September 29. Ethiopia mobilized.
October 2. Italy announced national mobilization.
October 3. Italo-Ethiopian War commenced.
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October 5. President Roosevelt embargoed arras and munitions to Italy and
Ethiopia.
October 9. Secretary Hull informed the League that there was no need to ask
the United States to participate in joint sanctions as "...definite
measures have already been taken by the United States in accordance with
our own limitations and policies." Peace and War
,
284.
November 11. Roosevelt stated that the "primary purpose of this Nation is to
avoid being drawn into war." Peace and War
,
289.
November 18. The League of Nations invoked economic sanctions against Italy.
December 1. Chiang Kai-shek became President of the Executive Yuan in China.
December 7-8. Hoare-Laval peace plan negotiated in Paris for the Italo-
Ethiopian War.
December 22. Anthony Eden became Britain's Foreign Secretary. Sir Samuel
Hoare resigned after his peace plan was loudly condemned as a sell-out
to Italy.
1936
January 15. Japan withdrew from the London Naval Conference. Conference had
commenced on December 9, 1935.
February 29. Neutrality Act of 1935 renewed until May 1, 1937.
March 7. German armed forces occupied the Rhineland.
Germany offered to enter extensive negotiations with France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands concerning demilitarized zones and nonaggression
pacts.
March 8. France and Belgium requested that the League Council consider
Germany's entry into the demilitarized zone and repudiation of the
Locarno Pact. (Britain and Italy had guaranteed the pact whereby the
borders of France and Belgium were recognized by Germany.)
March 9. Britain condemned Germany's occupation of the Rhineland and promised
aid to France in case of an attack by Germany.
March 12. The Locarno Powers, Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, declared
that Germany's action was illegal.
May 5. Mussolini claimed victory in Italo-Ethiopian War.
July 4. League of Nations recommended an end to sanctions against Italy.
July 17. General Franco revolted to begin the Spanish Civil War.
August 7. The United States stated it would not interfere in Spain.
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August 15. Britain and France pledged nonintervention in Spain and prohibited
shipments of war materials.
August 17. Germany accepted nonintervention in Spain as a stated policy.
August 22. The United States placed a moral embargo on arms and ammunition
to Spain.
August 23. Russia accepted the nonintervention policy for Spain.
September 9. Nonintervention Committee held its first meeting in London.
September 15. The United States refused to join in the collective act of the
Nonintervention Committee.
October 14. Belgium proclaimed its status as a world neutral.
October 25. Rome-Berlin Axis established for diplomatic cooperation.
November 3. Franklin D. Roosevelt reelected President of the United States.
November 14. Germany repudiated international control of the Rhine, Elbe,
Oder, and Danube Rivers.
November 18. Germany and Italy recognized General Franco as the head of the
Spanish Government.
November 25. Germany and Japan signed an Anti-Comintern Pact.
December 1-23. Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held
at Buenos Aires.
December 12-25. Chiang Kai-shek kidnapped by the communists.
December 31. Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of
1930 expired.
1937
January 2. Italy and Britain signed a pact to maintain the status quo in the
Mediterranean.
January 8. Congress passed a resolution to prohibit export of war materials
to Spain.
February 4. General Senjuro Hayashi became premier of Japan.
February 5. President Roosevelt announced his "court packing" plan.
April 20. Nonintervention Committee commenced patrol of Spanish borders to
prevent entrance of volunteers and munitions.
April 30. Japanese Government defeated in general elections.

97
May 1. President Roosevelt signed the "permanent" Neutrality Act into law.
May 28. Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister of Britain upon the resig-
nation of Stanley Baldwin.
May 29. The League of Nations denounced the bombing of open towns in Spain.
May 31. General Hayashi resigned as Premier of Japan.
June 4. Prince Fumimaro Konoye became Premier of Japan.
June 23. Camille Chautemps succeeded Leon Blum as the head of the French
Government
.
July 7-8. Confrontation between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at the Marco
Polo Bridge signalled the start of the Sino-Japanese Undeclared War.
July 11. Announcement made of a tentative agreement for settlement of the
Sino-Japanese Incident. (Japanese terms, however, were not acceptable
to the central Chinese Government in Nanking.)
July 12. Secretary Hull expressed official concern about the hostilities to
both the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors.
July 13. Britain proposed a joint Anglo-American-French appeal for moderation
in the Sino-Japanese dispute. The United States refused and suggested
that action along parallel lines was appropriate.
July 15. France pledged full cooperation if Britain and the United States
would intervene actively in the Undeclared War.
July 16. Britain recommended to China and Japan that all troop movements
cease on July 17. Neither side accepted.
China informed the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of the
status and threat of Japan in North China.
Secretary Hull released a statement of "principles of international
conduct" and the United States position on international problems.
July 18-19. France proposed that action be taken in accordance with the Boxer
Protocol, the Covenant of the League, or the Nine Power Treaty.
July 19. Japanese military authorities announced that an agreement was con-
cluded with Chinese military authorities in North China. Nanking denied
the validity of any such agreement.
July 20. Britain proposed that a joint Anglo-American approach be made to
China and Japan stating that if they would cease all troop movements the
United States and Britain would then suggest methods to break the dead-
lock. The United States rejected the plan.
July 22. The "court packing" plan was officially defeated.
July 25-26. Fighting spread to Langfang and Peiping.
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July 27. Britain, France, and the United States made independent appeals to
China and Japan to limit the hostilities.
July 28. Britain renewed her July 20 proposal. Not accepted.
July 29. Chiang Kai-shek stated that the conflict in North China was no
longer a matter for local settlement. Japanese Diet was told that the
Government would reject any interference by outside powers in the problem
in China.
August 9. Japanese naval officer and a seaman were shot at the Hungjao Air-
port.
August 10-11. The United States and Great Britain made independent offers of
good offices to Japan and China.
August 12. Senator Hugo Black nominated to the Supreme Court.
August 13. Battle for Shanghai commenced.
August 13-30. "Pirate" submarines attacked non-Spanish shipping in the
Mediterranean.
August 15. USS Augusta bombed by Chinese aviators—no fatalities.
August 17. Secretary Hull outlined a "middle-of-the-road" policy for foreign
affairs.
The Navy Department announced that 1200 Marines were to be sent
to Shanghai to assist United States nationals.
August 18. Britain proposed that Japan withdraw forces from Shanghai and that
the Western Powers would protect Japanese nationals. The United States
rejected the British proposal.
August 20. USS Augusta was hit by a bomb or shell of unknown origin. One
sailor was killed.
August 21. Russia and China signed a five year nonaggression pact.
August 23. Japanese troops landed at Woosung.
Secretary Hull issued a statement of United States policy which
made the principles of international conduct, as listed in his July 16
release, directly applicable to the situation in the Far East.
August 25. Japan announced a partial blockade against Chinese shipping.
August 26. Japanese aviators attacked British Embassy cars. Britain's
Ambassador was wounded.
France appealed to the United States for joint cooperation in
settling the Far East conflict.




American passenger ship President Hoover mistakenly bombed off
Shanghai Harbor by Chinese flyers.
September 5. Japan extended its blockade to the entire China coast.
President Roosevelt announced that Americans staying in China
did so at their own risk.
September 6. Britain and France called for a "piracy" conference to meet at
Nyon.
September 9. Italy and Germany refuse to attend the "piracy" conference.
September 11. Japan began an offensive against Chinese armies south of
Peiping and Tientsin.
September 12. China appealed to the League and invoked Articles 10, 11, and 17
of the Covenant against Japan.
September 14. President Roosevelt forbade government owned ships to carry
munitions to Japan and China.
Britain, France, and Russia agreed to suppress "piracy" in the
Mediterranean.
September 15. China's Delegate to the League warned of the possibility of a
world conflict if Japan's aggression went unchecked.
League Council referred the Sino-Japanese dispute to the Far
Eastern Advisory Committee.
September 16. American steamer Wichita ordered to unload planes bound for
China at San Pedro, California.
September 19-25. Japanese bomb Nanking and Canton. Britain and the United
States individually protested.
September 20. Leland Harrison, American Minister to Switzerland, was
authorized to attend meetings of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee.
September 23. Germany refused to participate with the Far Eastern Advisory
Committee.
September 25. Japan refused to participate with the Far Eastern Advisory
Committee.
September 28. The League Assembly condemned Japanese aerial bombing in China.
The United States endorsed the condemnation.
September 30. Italy consented to join the antipiracy patrol in the Mediter-
ranean.
October 1. Britain proposed an economic boycott against Japan. The United
States rejected the proposal.
October 5. President Roosevelt delivered his "Quarantine" Speech at Chicago.
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October 6. The Assembly of the League of Nations declared that Japan had
violated the Nine Power Treaty. The United States concurred with the
general conclusions of the League.
October 9. Japan released a statement that denied that her action in China
had violated any existing treaties.
October 12. President Roosevelt emphasized to the nation that the coming
conference in Brussels would attempt to seek a solution to the difficul-
ties in the Far East by "agreement."
October 15. Belgium released invitations to the signatories of the Nine Power
Treaty for a conference to convene at Brussels on October 30 (later
changed to November 3).
Anthony Eden promised Britain's cooperation in the spirit of the
"Quarantine" Speech.
October 18. Stock market suffered it worst decline since September 24, 1931.
Autonomy demanded by Sudeten Germans.
October 19. President Roosevelt reiterated his October 12 statement to the
nation and announced that Norman H. Davis was appointed the United States
Delegate to the Brussels Conference.
Britain proposed to the United States that methods of "positive
action" be considered by the conferees. The United States stated that
such methods were not appropriate for a conference that was to reach a
solution by "agreement."
October 26. Japanese commenced occupying Shanghai.
October 27. Japan declined the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference.
October 29. Germany declined to attend the Brussels Conference.
November 3. Nine Power Conference commenced at Brussels.
November 6. Italy joined the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.
November 7. Second invitation was sent to Japan to attend Brussels Conference
Offer was extended for Japan to meet with a smaller group to discuss Sino-
Japanese differences.
November 10. Japanese completed encirclement of Shanghai and the battle for
Shanghai was effectively over.
November 11. Italy joined the antipiracy patrol in the Mediterranean.
November 12. Japan refused the second invitation to the Brussels Conference.
November 13. China's Delegate to the Conference asked for concerted action to
maintain peace in the Far East.




November 15. The United States Congress met in a special session. Session
called to combat domestic recession and to consider legislation which
the President labelled as vital.
November 18. The Chinese Government announced that they were evacuating
Nanking in the face of Japanese advances.
November 24. The Brussels Conference adopted its final report and adjourned,





Diaries, Memoirs, and Biographies.
Fortunately many statesmen in 1937 kept detailed diaries of their activ-
ities. Joseph C. Grew's Turbulent Era : A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years
,
1904-1945 (Boston, 1952), is based on his diaries and contains a wealth of
information from Grew's Tokyo position. John Morton Blum's From the Morgenthau
Diaries : Years of Crisis
,
1928-1938 (Boston, 1965), and Harold L. Ickes' The
Inside Struggle
,
1936-1939 (New York, 1954), contain mostly material related
to the Treasury and Interior Departments, but occasional insight is given to
cabinet meetings and some of the decisions behind foreign policies. On the
other hand Jay Pierrepont Moffat's The Moffat Papers : Selections from the
Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat
,
1919-1943 edited by Nancy H.
Hooker (Cambridge, 1956), deals exclusively with events in foreign affairs,
one of which is the Brussels Conference. William Phillips' Ventures in Dip -
lomacy (Portland, 1952), is a more generalized account of the Ambassador's
diplomatic career, but it does have some useful information on developments in
Europe during the 1930' s.
Cordell Hull's The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), provides an
abundance of information about the conduct of foreign affairs during his tenure
as Secretary of State. In all fairness it must be stated that the memoirs
present a highly flattering portrait of Mr. Hull's foreign policy role.
Anthony Eden' s Facing The Dictators : the Memoirs of Anthony Eden , Earl of
Avon (Boston, 1965), is the British counterpart to Hull's memoirs. Eden's
account is rewarding in that it provides the British interpretation of many
diplomatic exchanges which sometimes differs markedly from the American one.
Tom Connally and Alfred Steinberg, My_ Name Is Tom Connally (New York,
1954), is useful in the respect that it gives some insight to the personalities
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of the main figures in the Administration; otherwise, it deals with domestic
aspects of the New Deal and is of little value for foreign policy studies.
Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln, 1963), presents a critical and
unsympathetic look at the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Dorothy Detzer, Appointment on the Hill (New York, 19A8) , is a personal account
of Miss Detzer 1 s career as a lobbyist for the peace movement.
Several books have been written about Roosevelt by people who had worked
closely with him in a personal sense. All of these books contain useful
anecdotes and occasional glimpses of a complex personality in unguarded
moments. Two of the more useful of these publications are Grace Tully, F.D.R.
,
My Boss (New York, 1949), and Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New
York, 1952). Raymond Moley's After Seven Years (New York, 1939) is a critical
appraisal of Roosevelt and his policies. The book is slanted toward economic
policies and consequently portrays Moley's belief in economic nationalism and
mandatory neutrality. Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1946),
is centered on the activities of the Labor Department, but it does present a
friendly critique and analysis of Roosevelt's actions.
There are a large number of biographies written about Roosevelt. Unfor-
tunately, the last few months of 1937 have not received as much emphasis as
other more dramatic periods. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins : An
Intimate History (New York, 1950), is almost devoid of information on this
period in Roosevelt's life. The reason for this is that Hopkin's wife had
recently passed away and he wasn't active in politics at this time. James
MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), is
generally excellent with a full and penetrating treatment of the neutrality
issue. Edgar Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership , 1933-1945 (Philadelphia,
1955), is very sketchy in covering the events of 1937 and 1938; in fact, no
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mention is even made of the Brussels Conference. Arthur M. Schlesinger ' s The
Age of Roosevelt (Boston, 1957-1960), is a multi-volume study of Roosevelt's
life. Unfortunately, the series presently ends with the reelection of 1936.
Basil Rauch, Roosevelt From Munich to Pearl Harbor : A Study in the Creation
of a Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), was written to refute revisionist inter-
pretations of America's entry into the war. By far, the majority of the book
is devoted to post-Munich events; thus the book is somewhat weak on the
earlier events of 1937.
General Works.
Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 :
From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared
Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, 1964), is a thoroughly documented and detailed
presentation of a subject that has been largely overlooked by the academic
community. There are two excellent diplomatic histories which cover events
leading to World War II. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton,
1950), emphasizes Japanese American relations. Both European and Pacific
events are detailed in the comprehensive history of William L. Langer and S.
Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation : The World Crisis of 1937-1940
and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1952).
Britain's foreign policy in the Far East (relative to Europe) has been
largely ignored in academic writings. Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from
China : British Policy in the Far East, 1937-1941 (Seattle, 1967), is a
succinct description of the British withdrawal from prominence as the western
leader in the Far East. United States foreign policy and growing influence in
the Far East prior to World War II is adequately treated in Robert A. Devine,
The Reluctant Belligerent : American Entry into World War II (New York, 1965).
Extensive use of Japanese sources gives emphasis to Japan's foreign policy in
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David J . Lu, From The Marco Polo Bridge To Pearl Harbor : Japan's Entry Into
World War II (Washington, 1961)
.
Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1951)
,
provides some insight to the politics behind the "decisions." In general,
Welles tends to criticize Hull, perhaps too harshly, and to overstate his own
position and role in foreign affairs.
The subject of isolation is presented well in Manfred Jonas, Isolationism
In America
,
1935-1941 (Ithaca, 1966) . Jonas probes in great detail the
attitudes, policies, and personalities that led to the strong sentiment for
isolation throughout the country in the 1930' s. Closely related to Jonas'
study is Robert A. Divine's The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, 1962).
Divine has traced the struggle to achieve and then circumvent neutrality
legislation. He has made extensive use of government documents and presents
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